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Abstract 
Using a novel dataset on the 15 European banks classified as G-SIBs from 2005 to 2014, we find that 
the impact of foreign expansion on risk is always negative and significant for most individual and 
systemic risk metrics. In the case of individual metrics, we also find that foreign expansion affects risk 
through a competition channel as the estimated impact of openings differs between host countries that 
are more or less competitive than the source country. The systemic risk metrics also decline with 
respect to expansion, though results for the competition channel are more mixed, suggesting that 
systemic risk is more likely to be affected by country or business models characteristics that go beyond 
and above the differential intensity of competition between source and host markets. Empirical results 
can be rationalized through a simple model with oligopolistic/oligopsonistic banks and endogenous 
assets/liabilities risk. 
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1 Introduction
How bank globalization affects risk is an open question. Already prior to the 2007-2008
crisis, Rajan [53] highlighted the consequences of financial and banking globalization for risk and
contagion. As the full insurance paradigm is difficult to achieve, stronger financial linkages among
countries and global banks’ entries in foreign markets were expected to increase the correlation
of shocks and the probability of contagion. In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis this
premonition seemed to materialize as a financial and banking crisis originated in the US spread
worldwide. It also became apparent that around the world, banks had been loading too much
risk on their balance sheets (Adrian and Shin [4]). Banks’ risk-taking was then attributed to two
main causes: lax monetary policy and banking globalization.
An extensive literature has studied the role of expansionary monetary policy.1 Low interest
rates indeed induce banks to excessive leverage since short-term liabilities become cheaper than
equity capital.2 They also make banks invest in riskier assets due to a search-for-yield attitude.3
Several empirical studies have investigated the impact of monetary policy on bank risk. Many
of these studies use novel datasets to measure individual bank risk. For instance, Paligorova
and Santos [51] use information on changes in lending standards from lending surveys; Altunbas,
Gambacorta, and Marquez-Ibanez [7] use rating agency estimates; Dell’Arriccia, Laeven and
Suarez [32] use banks’ internal ratings on loans. Other papers use credit registry information on
default history (e.g. Jimenez et al. [42], Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro [41]). All these papers
focus on the role of monetary policy for banks’ risk-taking, use data from single countries and
measure risk at individual bank level mostly relying on book-based indexes.
While there has been large consensus that low interest rates can trigger banks’ risk-taking,
studies on banking globalization are more divided. Goetz, Laeven and Levine [38] and Levine,
Lin and Xie [45] find that geographic expansion across US states reduces banks’ riskiness thanks
to better asset diversification. Faia, Ottaviano and Sanchez-Arjona [35] reach a similar conclusion
in the case of the geographic expansion of European banks across European countries. A number
of other papers focus on whether foreign banks stabilize or destabilize local credit in response
to shocks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld [31] find that in emerging European countries lending by
1See Borio and Zhu [18] and Adrian and Shin [4].
2See Angeloni and Faia [10].
3See Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez [32] and Martinez-Miera and Repullo [46] among others.
foreign banks has been more stable than lending by domestic banks during crises and Claessens
and van Horen [30] find that even after the crisis foreign bank presence declined by less than
other cross-border activities. Cetorelli and Goldberg [25] show that, following liquidity shocks,
multinational banks can be a stabilizing force as they can transfer liquidity across borders. Other
papers note that multinational banks have less experience and monitoring abilities vis-a-vis local
lending and asset management and this can tighten credit, in particular for small and medium
enterprises. Mian [48] finds that in Pakistan foreign banks avoid lending to opaque firms since
the cultural distance between the firms’ CEO and the loan officer is large. Giannetti and Ongena
[37], using evidence for Eastern Europe, find that informationally opaque firms are penalized
by multinational banks. While none of those papers directly examines the role of multinational
banks for risk-taking, Faia, Ottaviano and Sanchez Arjona [35] look at the impact of foreign
expansion on bank risk operating through asset diversification.
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to this body of knowledge in several ways.
First, we provide a deeper investigation of the impact of banks’ foreign expansion on risk-taking
from both individual and systemic viewpoints, and relying on both book-based and market-based
risk measures.4 Second, we study a someway neglected channel through which banks’ foreign
expansion may affect risk-taking when national banking markets differ in terms of the intensity
of competition. Third, to do so, we build a rich cross-country dataset on European global banks’
foreign expansion including their main characteristics as well as key features of their countries of
operation. Fourth, to inform the empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of the banking
sector that highlights the effects of competition on risk working through both the assets and the
liabilities sides of banks’ balance sheets. Finally, we adopt a novel instrumentation strategy to
deal with possible reverse causation from banks’ risk-taking to their foreign expansion in markets
with different intensity of competition.
In our model, imperfectly competitive banks raise deposits from households to finance firms’
projects through loans. On the assets side, loans are risky due to firms’ moral hazard arising
from limited liability (Boyd and De Nicolo [19]; Faia and Ottaviano [34]). On the liabilities
side, as deposits are short-term liabilities whereas loans are partially illiquid long-term assets,
liquidity mismatch exposes banks to bank run-vulnerability (Morris and Shin [49]; Rochet and
4This is important as book-based measure may respond more slowly than market-based measure to changes
in competition or regulation. We will discuss the pros and cons of different risk measures in Section 3.1.
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Vives [54]). In this setup, the impact of more competition on overall bank risk in ambiguous
for two reasons. First, more competition may increase or decrease the amounts of deposits
raised and loans extended by the bank (‘scale effect of competition’). Second, the change in
firm risk-taking on the assets side may dominate or be dominated by the opposite change in
bank run-vulnerability on the liabilities side (‘risk effect of scale’). Accordingly, whether overall
risk increases when a bank expands its operations to a foreign market depends on whether the
probability of no bankruptcy in that market is higher or lower than in the home market. This in
turn depends on whether the number of competing banks is different between the two markets.
However, the ambiguous signs of the scale effect of competition and of the risk effect of scale
imply that whether a larger number of banks are associated with larger or smaller probability of
no bankruptcy is undecided from a theoretical viewpoint. Whether foreign expansion increases
or decreases overall risk is ultimately an empirical issue that depends on which effects dominates
in reality.
To address this empirical issue we have assembled a novel dataset on the activities of the
15 European banks classified as G-SIBs by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [12]
(BCBS) at the end of 2015 over a 10-year time period from 2005 to 2014. The focus on G-SIBs
is explained by their centrality as risk spreaders. These banks are located in 8 home countries:
BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole Group and Société Générale in France; Banco Santander in Spain;
Unicredit in Italy; HSBC, Standard Chartered, RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) and Barclays in
the United Kingdom; Deutsche Bank in Germany; ING Bank in the Netherlands; UBS and Credit
Suisse in Switzerland and Nordea in Sweden. We also consider BPCE, a banking group consisting
of independent, but complementary commercial banking networks that provide also wholesale
banking, asset management and financial services. The dataset includes 38 potential destination
countries, 5 individual bank risk measures and 4 systemic risk metrics together with additional
balance sheet information. Given the large interest in global banking other researchers have also
assembled data on foreign expansion. Claessens and van Horen [29] and [30] were the first to
build a dataset listing branches and subsidiaries located in 137 countries to answer questions
related to the impact of global banking on credit conditions. Their dataset, however, does not
report the name of the parent holding and information needed to compute risk metrics. Both
are crucial for our analysis. Moreover, their dataset mostly focuses on retail-banking activities,
while we also look at other activities (such as investment banking) that may contribuite to bank
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risk. Faia, Ottaviano and Sanchez Arjona [35] also use data on entries, but their dataset is
different and less extensive than the one used in the present paper. In particular, the dataset
we use here contains an expanded set of banks’ foreign activities that better accounts for risk
determinants and entries as well as additional variables that allow us to test how competition
affects the relation between foreign expansion and bank risk, which is our specific focus.
We deal with the potential endogeneity bias due to reverse causation from banks’ risk-taking
to their foreign expansion by using a 2SLS strategy similar to the one adopted by Goetz, Laeven
and Levine [38] and Levine Lin and Xi [45] in studies linking the volatility of equity prices for
US banks with their cross-state expansion. The strategy consists in instrumenting the observed
geographic expansion of a bank with the one predicted by a ‘gravity equation’. This method is
akin to the one used by Frankel and Romer [36], who study the impact of international trade
on countries’ economic performance by instrumenting the observed bilateral trade flows (which
arguably depend on countries’ economic performance) with the ones predicted by geographic
variables and fixed country characteristics. Using this strategy and our own dataset we find that
the impact of foreign expansion on risk is negative and significant for most individual and systemic
risk metrics. In the case of individual metrics we also find that the competition channel is indeed
at work, and this happens through a dominant ‘margin effect’ as the estimated coefficients on
openings in lower concentration host countries (as measured by the Herfindahl index, or HHI on
total assets) are not statistically different from zero whereas those in higher concentration host
countries tend to be negative. As for systemic risk, our findings on the competition channel are
mixed and this can be explained by the fact that systemic risk is more likely to be affected by a
number of country and business models characteristics that go beyond and above the differential
intensity of competition between source and host markets.
The interplay between competition and fragility is an important issue in the banking litera-
ture in general. Many theoretical contributions and empirical analyses have been conducted to
examine whether more competition reduces or increases fragility in banking (Vives [60]). With
respect to the existing literature, we innovate on both theory and empirics. Existing theoretical
contributions largely use static models of banks operating in closed economy. These models
tend to focus on Cournot-Nash competition. Allen and Gale [5] and [6] analyse competition
among banks that can choose the level of assets’ risk and show that more competition leads to
more risk-taking. Their model hinges on competition in the deposit market. Banks seeking to
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attract deposits in a tougher competitive setting are forced to offer higher deposit rates. This
forces banks to search for yield in assets, thus encouraging risk-taking. Boyd and De Nicolo [19]
highlight a different channel through which more competition in the loan market reduces loan
rates, thus inducing firms to select projects with lower returns but also lower risk. Through
this channel, competition may improve the average quality of the loans’ applicants and reduce
adverse selection (see also Stiglitz and Weiss [58]).
Besides the closed economy case, a few papers analyse the theoretical underpinnings of global
banking. Bruno and Shin [21] build a model of the international banking system where global
banks raise short term funds at worldwide level, but interact with local banks for the provision
of loans. They emphasize banks’ leverage cycles. Niepman [50] proposes a model in which the
pattern of foreign bank asset and liability holdings emerges endogenously because of international
differences in relative factor endowments and banking efficiency. Competition and risk-shifting
are not part of the analysis. More recently, building on Boyd and De Nicolo [19], Faia and
Ottaviano [34] show that foreign expansion can induce for global banks a selection effect akin to
the one highlighted by Melitz [47] for exporting firms. In a model of banking industry dynamics
with domestic and foreign destination markets they find that expansion abroad has two main
effects. First, by increasing competitive pressures it improves loans’ selection, thereby raising the
option value of entry. This in turn implies that only banks with better long run growth prospects
enter the market. Second, the entry of foreign banks, by increasing total loans supply, generates
strategic complementarities. The combination of these two forces implies that foreign expansion
tends to reduce bank risk whenever loan rates fall reducing firms’ risk-shifting incentives and
promoting a better selection of projects with lower probability of default. Differently from all
these contributions, our model allows for risk to arise not only on the assets side but also the
liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets.
The fundamental ambiguity highlighted by our model may explain why the existing evidence
on the relation between competition and risk is largely inconclusive due to contradicting empirical
findings. In principle, inconclusiveness could arise from the fact that several papers use traditional
competition indicators, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the Lerner index or the
Panzer-Rosse H-statistic, which are all plagued by various problems. The HHI suffers from
endogeneity and ignores contestability; the Lerner index does not take risk or the macroeconomy
into account; the Panzer-Rosse H-statistic delivers results that depend on the assumptions made
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about the production function. However, even in studies using regulatory reforms to overcome
those limitations evidence remains inconclusive. Keeley [43] relates deregulation in the US to
bank fragility by testing the charter value theory. The underlying idea is that competition
erodes banks’ profits and franchise values, thus inducing banks to invest in riskier activities.5
For Spanish banks Jimenez et al. [42] show that non-performing loans fall as the Lerner index
rises, but also find evidence of a U-shaped relation between risk and concentration.6 Salas and
Saurina [55] show that liberalization in Spain erodes banks’ charter values and increases their
likelihood of insolvency. For the US Hanson, Kashyap and Stein [39] point out that liberalization
induces banks to leverage more, hence increasing risk-taking on the liability side. Using cross-
country data Shehzad and De Haan [57] reach the conclusion that liberalization reduces the
likelihood of systemic crises. Anginer et al. [9] find that competition, again measured by the
Lerner index, induces banks to diversify more and reduces systemic risk.7 Similar trade-offs have
been investigated with respect to the specific question of the role of banks’ internationalization for
banking stability: foreign entry may improve services and reduce margins, but it can also erode
charter values. Barth et al. [11], Claessens [26] and Yeyati and Micco [61] find that cross-border
banking increases growth and reduces fragility. Buch, Koch and Koetter [23] empirically show
that for German banks higher domestic market power is associated with lower risk, while bank
internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk. Differently from all these contributions,
we use a richer cross-country dataset, a novel instrumentation strategy and a more comprehensive
set of risk measures for individual as well as systemic risk.
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
5Another reason why more competition may increase risk is by reducing incentives to relationship lending
(see, e.g., Boot and Greenbaum [17] and Berger and Udell [15] among others). With tougher competition it is
easier for firms to change bank, hence there is less expected time to recoup investments in relationship building.
This discourages investment in monitoring and may increase the risk of non-performing loans.
6This is reminiscent of a theoretical result in Martinez-Miera and Repullo [46], who revisit the insights of Boyd
and De Nicolo [19] when the correlation of projects’ failures is imperfect as in Vasicek [59] rather than perfect as
in the original paper. They note that lower loan rates reduce banks’ profit margins from non-defaulting loans,
which generates a U-shaped relation between competition and banks’ aggregate failure rate (‘systemic risk’).
7A number of studies find that more risk is associated with larger banks and more concentrated markets.
Laeven et al [44] show that, in terms of individual bank risk, larger banks are riskier than smaller ones. They
also highlight that systemic risk, as measured by SRISK, increases with bank size and complexity.
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Section 3 introduces the dataset and the variables we use. Section 4 explains our empirical
strategy. Section 5 reports the results on foreign expansion and risk taking. Section 6 looks into
the competition channel. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a bank headquartered in its home country that has expanded its operations also to
a foreign one. National markets are segmented so that the bank maximizes profits separately
at home and abroad. The two markets are identical in all respects except for the intensity of
competition as captured by the number of competing banks. This symmetry allows to focus on
the home market and extend the corresponding results to the foreign market by analogy.
In the home market the bank raises funds through short-term liabilities d (‘deposits’) and
uses them to finance firms’ projects through partially illiquid long-term assets l (‘loans’). The
structure of the banking market is imperfectly competitive. This implies that the bank maximizes
profits based on deposits’ residual supply (‘oligopsony’) and loan’s residual demand (‘oligopoly’)
as given by d = (rD)
εDn and l = (rL)
−εLn respectively, where n > 1 is the number of banks
competing in the home market, rD is the rate of return on deposits and rL is the rate of return
on loans. The exponents εDn and εLn, with εD > 1 and εL > 1, are the deposit supply elasticity
and the (absolute value of) the loan demand elasticity as perceived by the bank. They inversely
capture its oligopsonistic market power in the deposit market and its oligopolistic market power
in loan market, with both falling as the number of competitors increases. For any initial number
of bank, εD > εL (εD < εL) implies that a given change in n has stronger (weaker) impact on
deposit supply elasticity than on loan demand elasticity, thus making deposits supplied relatively
more (less) responsive to rD than loans demanded to rL.
As in Boyd and De Nicolo [19] and Faia and Ottaviano [34], home firms acquire bank loans to
invest in risky investment projects, with higher investment returns being associated with lower
success probability p (‘probability of no default’). Given the return on loans rL, firms choose both
the amount of loans they demand and the projects’ risk-return profiles. Due to moral hazard
originating from limited liability, when confronted with higher loan rates, firms’ incentives toward
risk-shifting are higher so that risk-taking endogenously increases as firms invest more in tail risk.
As loan demand is downward sloping, the negative relation between the loan rate rL and the
success probability p implies a positive relation between the amount of loans l and p itself, which
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we capture as l = pεp for p ∈ [0, 1] with εp > 0 where 1/εp is the elasticity of firms’ risk-taking
to bank loans. This implies:
p =

(
l
αp
) 1
εp for l ≤ αp
1 for l > αp
. (1)
To finance firms’ projects, banks raise deposits. However, as loans are partially illiquid long-
term assets whereas deposits are short-term liabilities, banks are exposed to liquidity mismatch
opening up the possibility of bank runs. As in Morris and Shin [49] and Rochet and Vives [54],
a bank run happens when depositors think that their bank does not have enough liquid assets
to cover short-term liabilities.8 This is the case for rDd > rLνl where rDd is payments due by
the bank to depositors, rLl is loan repayments due by firms to the bank and ν is a ‘signal’ on
assets liquidity that depositors get. The signal is a random variable with support ranging from
0 (when loans are perfectly illiquid) to 1 (when loans are perfectly liquid) with c.d.f. F (v). The
‘probability of no bank run’ is then given by q = Pr[rDd ≤ rLνl] = 1− F (rDd/rLl).
The bank maximizes expected profit pi = pq (rLl − rDd), given by the gap between firms’ loan
repayments rLl and the bank’s payments to depositors rDd, multiplied by the probability p that
firms do not default on their loans and the probability q that there is no bank run. If loans are
not repaid or a bank run occurs, the bank becomes insolvent and goes bankrupt. We further
assume that: firms do not have internal funds and banks are their only source of funds; banks
can only finance firms using own liabilities. This implies that the bank’s amounts of loans and
deposits have to match so that d = l holds and the probability of no bank run can be restated as
q = 1− F (rD/rL). Given d = (rD)εDn and l = (rL)−εLn, the ratio rD/rL can be expressed as an
increasing function of d = l (i.e. rD/rL = l(εL+εD)/εLεDn), so that q is itself a decreasing function
of d = l: the larger the bank’s operations, d = l, the lower is the probability of no bank run
due to more likely liquidity mismatch. Without making specific assumptions about the signal
distribution F (v), we capture the negative relation between bank scale and the probability of
no bank run by the reduced form d = q−εq with εq > 0 for q ∈ [0, 1], where 1/εq is the (absolute
8Runs are mainly modelled in the literature in two ways. ‘Panic-based’ runs arise from liquidity shocks to
depositors. ‘Information-based’ runs arise from depositors’ coordination on signals about fundamentals or bank
balance sheet variables as in our case.
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value of the) elasticity of the bank’s run-vulnerability to mismatch. This implies:
q =
 1 for d < αq( d
αq
)− 1
εq for d ≥ αq
. (2)
Recalling d = l together with risk-taking (1) and run-vulnerability (2) allows us to express
the overall probability of no bankruptcy as:
pq =

(
l
αp
) 1
εp for l < αq(
l
αp
) 1
εp
(
l
αq
)− 1
εq for αq ≤ l ≤ αp(
l
αq
)− 1
εq for l > αp
, (3)
which shows that: for low enough l the only source of uncertainty is firm risk-taking (‘project
insolvency’); for high enough l the only source of uncertainty is run-vulnerability (‘bank illiquid-
ity’); for intermediate l both firm risk-taking and run-vulnerability generate uncertainty as long
as αq < αp holds. In this case, pq is a piece-wise continuous function of l, increasing in l for
l < αq and decreasing in l for l > αp. For αq ≤ l ≤ αp it is increasing (decreasing) in l when
εq > εp (εq < εp) holds, that is, when more loans and deposits reduce risk-taking more (less)
than they raise run-vulnerability.
To better highlight the ambiguous effects of competition on bank risk, in what follows we
focus on the case in which both firm risk-taking and run-vulnerability matter (αq ≤ l ≤ αp). In
this case, after imposing d = l, (3) together with the expressions of deposit supply d = (rD)
εDn
and loan demand l = (rL)
−εLn , we can write banks’ maximization with respect to l as:
pi =
[(
l
αp
) 1
εp
(
l
αq
)− 1
εq
](
l
− 1
εLn − l 1εDn
)
l. (4)
where the first, second and third factors on the right hand side capture the three channels through
which the amount of loans (and deposits) l affects profit: overall risk, loan-deposit margin and
scale respectively. Larger l increases scale and decreases the loan-deposit margin. Differently,
the impact of l on overall risk is ambiguous as more loans reduce firm risk-taking, but more
loans and deposits raise bank run-vulnerability. Accordingly, larger l decreases overall risk, when
it has a stronger impact on firm risk-taking than on bank run-vulnerability, which happens for
εp > εq. Vice versa, larger l increases overall risk for εp < εq9.
9In the knife-edge case with εp = εq, overall risk does not depend on l as assets risk and liabilities risk extactly
offset each other.
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Profit 4 is maximized for the amount of loans (and deposits):
l∗ =
(
r∗L
r∗D
)− εDεL
εD+εL
n
, (5)
where the optimal loan-deposit margin is given by:
r∗L
r∗D
=
1 + 1
εp
− 1
εq
+ 1
εDn
1 + 1
εp
− 1
εq
− 1
εLn
> 1. (6)
This margin also determines the probabilities of no firm default and no bank run:
p∗ =
(
1
αp
) 1
εp
(
r∗L
r∗D
)− εDεL
εD+εL
n
εp
and q∗ =
(
1
αq
)− 1
εq
(
r∗L
r∗D
) εDεL
εD+εL
n
εq
(7)
with overall probability of no bankruptcy:
p∗q∗ =
(
1
αp
) 1
εp
(
1
αq
)− 1
εq
(
r∗L
r∗D
) εDεL
εD+εL
εp−εq
εpεq
n
.
The above expressions shed light on how more competition (larger n) affects bank risk. There
are two opposite effects at work. On the one hand, holding r∗L/r∗D constant, (5) shows that larger
n leads to smaller l∗. On the other hand, (6) shows that larger n also leads to smaller r∗L/r∗D, as
r∗L falls and r∗D rises. Which effect dominates depends on the relative elasticities of loan demand
and deposit supply. In particular, (6) implies that, when n increases, the fall in r∗L/r∗D is more
pronounced for larger εL/εD. Hence, when εL is large (small) relative to εD, more competition
increases (decreases) l∗. In turn, as l∗ increases (decreases), firm risk-taking decreases (increases),
but bank run vulnerability increases (decreases). Whether this leads to higher or lower overall
bank risk depends on whether less (more) firm risk-taking dominates more (less) bank run-
vulnerability, that is, on whether εp > εq (εp < εq) holds.
To summarize, the impact of more competition on overall bank risk is ambiguous for two
reasons. First, more competition may increase or decrease the amounts of deposits raised and
loans extended by the bank (‘scale effect of competition’). Second, the change in firm risk-taking
on the assets side may dominate or be dominated by the opposite change in bank run-vulnerability
on the liabilities side (‘risk effect of scale’). Accordingly, whether overall risk increased when our
bank expanded its operations to the foreign market, depends on whether the probability of no
bankruptcy in that market was higher or lower than in the home market. This in turn depends
on whether the number of competing banks is different between the two markets. However,
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the ambiguous signs of the scale effect of competition and of the risk effect of scale imply that
whether a larger number of banks is associated with larger or smaller probability of no bankruptcy
is ambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint, and thus whether foreign expansion increases or
decreases overall risk is ultimately an empirical issue. In the next sections we will tackle this
issue in two steps. First, we will check how foreign expansion affects bank risk. Second, we will
check whether the sign of the effect of foreign expansion on bank risk is associated with more or
less competition in the foreign market relative to the home one.
3 Data
As anticipated in the introduction, to analyse the impact of foreign expansion on risk-taking,
we have built a novel dataset documenting the activities of the 15 European banks classified as G-
SIBs by the BCBS [12] at the end of 2015 over a 10-year time period from 2005 to 2014. We focus
on the G-SIBs as they are the main risk spreaders. These banks are located in 8 home countries:
BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole Group and Société Générale in France; Banco Santander in Spain;
Unicredit in Italy; HSBC, Standard Chartered, RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) and Barclays
in the United Kingdom; Deutsche Bank in Germany; ING Bank in the Netherlands; UBS and
Credit Suisse in Switzerland and Nordea in Sweden. We also consider BPCE, a banking group
created in 2009 consisting of independent, but complementary commercial banking networks that
provide also wholesale banking, asset management and financial services. The panel includes 38
potential destination countries in Europe (see Appendix 3 for the complete list) and is balanced
as for each bank we consider all potential host countries and years, even if the bank did not
establish presence in a foreign country in a specific year.10
Our analysis needs measures of bank risk and exogenous variation in bank expansion. We
discuss risk metrics first and then how we construct exogenous variation in expansion through
an instrumental variable approach.
3.1 Measuring Risk
Our dataset includes parent holdings’ balance sheets and other information needed to measure
bank risk. We use several standard risk metrics taken from the literature. Most importantly, we
10If the bank did not establish presence in a foreign country in a specific year, the count of its openings is set
equal to zero.
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consider both individual and systemic risk metrics.11 Overall, we extend the number of metrics
generally used in the literature and cover a large number of different risk.
3.1.1 Individual Risk
For individual risk we use market-based metrics as well book-based indicators founded on
banks’ internal risk models. This will allow us to make sure that our results are not driven by
either exuberant market conditions or biased internal risk assessment. In particular, the metrics
we consider are CDS price, loan-loss provision ratio (LLP), the standard deviation of returns,
the Z-score and the leverage ratio.
The CDS price and the standard deviation of weekly returns (taken from Bloomberg) are
market-based metrics. As such they have both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand,
they are not subject to potential bias associated with risk metrics computed from banks’ internal
risk models. On the other, they may be subject to fluctuations in market exuberance. To mitigate
this exuberance bias, we take the average CDS price and control for year fixed effects. In detail,
the CDS price corresponds to the price of insurance against the default of the bank. This is an
overall market assessment of bank risk on both the asset and the liability sides. The higher the
CDS price, the higher the risk taken by its seller and the higher the defaulting probability priced
by the market. Differently, the standard deviation of returns is based on a bank’s future stream
of profits. Higher equity price volatility indicates higher uncertainty about the bank’s ability
to generate profits, hence perception of higher bank risk. As in the case of the CDS price, we
control for potential bias from market exuberance by taking the average standard deviation of
returns and controlling for year fixed effects.
LLP is a book-based metric defined as the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans taken
from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope and measures the liquidity buffer that a bank sets aside to
cover losses in the event of defaulting borrowers. Hence, LLP captures the bank’s own assessment
of asset risk. For a given level of total assets, an increase in LLP indicates that the bank assigns
higher probability of loan losses (less solvent borrowers). This measure is obviously immune from
market exuberance, but it might be subject to internal biases. Moreover, it mainly captures asset
risk abstracting from liability risk.
The Z-score refers to the number of standard deviations a bank’s profits can fall before
11Where needed, such as in the case of ∆CoVaR, we run our own estimations using European data.
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triggering bankruptcy:
Z-score =
ROA + Capital Asset Ratio
σ(returns)
. (8)
As the Z-score combines book-based and market-based variables, it is largely immune from the
potential biases associated with the other individual risk measures. Note that a larger value of
the Z-score indicates that the bank is less likely to go bankrupt. We will have to keep this in
mind when interpreting our findings.
The leverage ratio (from the Centre for Risk Management of Lausanne and complemented
with data from the V-Lab) corresponds to the total value of a bank divided by its equity. This
basic book-based measure is used to specifically capture the probability of bank run or illiquidity
as it is by now well understood that in the run up to many financial crises (including the 2007-
2008 one), leverage has played a an important role as a key stress factor.12
3.1.2 Systemic Risk
Whether foreign expansion poses a threat for the economy as a whole depends very much on
whether it can create contagion and propagation effects to the entire banking system and to the
real economy. Interconnections in the banking system, arising for instance from cross-lending in
the interbank market or from cross-holdings positions of CDS contracts, can indeed amplify the
propagation of individual bank risk. Other pecuniary externalities, such as fire sales, also induce
contagion and propagation of individual shocks. The role of those aggregate externalities is best
captured by systemic risk metrics.
As systemic risk metrics we use the conditional capital short-fall (SRISK; Brownlees and
Engle [20]), the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES; Acharya et. al. [2]) and the
∆CoVaR computed using either CDS prices or equity prices (Adrian and Brunnermeier [3]).
SRISK is the capital short-fall of a bank conditional on a severe market decline. LRMES is
the propensity to be under-capitalized when the system as a whole is under-capitalized. Both
metrics are computed similarly, but are complementary. A key difference, according to Bisias et
al. [16] and Benoit et al. [13] is that LRMES represents the too-interconnected-to-fail paradigm,
while the SRISK, by taking into account the size of the institution, is closer to the too-big-to-fail
paradigm. Finally, ∆CoVaR measures the contribution to systemic risk when an institution goes
12See, e.g., Adrian and Shin [4], Borio and Zhu [18], Hanson, Kashyap and Stein [39]. Angeloni and Faia [10]
among many others.
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from normal to stressed situation (as defined by the VaR). ∆CoVaR is a mixture of both systemic
risk paradigms.13
As an overview, Table 1 reports the average risk and ranking for all metrics considered. The
table reveals that the ranks provided by the metrics are not perfectly correlated, which suggests
their complementarity.14 The table highlights that the individual risk may not be correlated
with the systemic risk. For instance Credit Agricole (AGRI) and Barclays (BARC) are ranked
similarly according to the individual risk measures. Looking at systemic risk offers a different
image. Despite having similar risk in terms of CDS price, Barclays is much more risky according
to LRMES, SRISK and ∆ CoVaR. The table also highlights that within a single group of metrics
(individual or systemic), the ranking may be different. The comparison between the LRMES
column and the SRISK column highlights that bigger banks tend to have a greater SRISK. This
is for instance the case for Deutsche Bank (DEUT), the second biggest G-SIB in our sample. On
the contrary, ING Bank (INGB), one of the smallest bank in our sample is ranked 6th in terms of
SRISK, while it is ranked first in terms of LRMES. Comparing the leverage ranking with SRISK
reveals the correlation between these two metrics as explained in Appendix B.
3.2 Measuring Foreign Expansion
The main sources for the data on foreign expansion consist of the banks’ annual reports,
ORBIS vintages and SEC reports. Specifically, we collect all entries and exits from the ORBIS
vintages. When information is missing in the ORBIS vintages, we resort to the banks’ annual
reports. If these present only synthetic information or missing information, we examine the SEC
reports. When merging the various sources, we make sure that the type of activities recorded
are consistent. In some cases new affiliates appear in the various reports simply as the result of a
change in the name of the local bank. For these cases we consult Bloomberg or Bankers’ Almanac
to track the exact bank number and to avoid double counting. For cases in which the holding
group has consolidated, merged with another group or changed name (this is for instance the case
for Natixis, a French bank now named BPCE), we consult other complementary sources, such
as consolidated statements, websites, archives, press releases and reports from national central
13Additional details on the computation or estimation of these systemic risk metrics can be found in Appendix
B.
14Looking at correlations between each risk measure provides similar findings, see appendix C.
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics – Average risk
Bank ln(CDS) LLP ln(σ returns) ln(Z-score) Leverage LRMES SRISK ∆ CoVaR ∆ CoVaR Equ
AGRI 4.18 3.05 -3.16 5.68 39.73 29.88 52.67 0.47 0.12(9) (5) (5) (13) (5) (15) (5) (9) (4)
BARC 4.2 1.73 -3.15 5.86 45.89 43.58 63.03 0.58 0.11(6) (9) (4) (10) (3) (3) (3) (2) (12)
BNPA 3.96 3.57 -3.31 5.86 33.39 45.93 63.49 0.5 0.13(13) (2) (9) (11) (8) (2) (2) (7) (3)
BPCE 5.05 3.46 -3.17 5.88 49.30 31.55 39.80 0.19 0.11(1) (3) (6) (9) (2) (14) (7) (15) (13)
BSCH 4.4 2.55 -3.46 6.11 16.11 37.8 15.38 0.46 0.12(3) (7) (13) (6) (13) (9) (12) (11) (5)
CRES 4.17 0.53 -3.39 6.34 23.07 35.63 18.62 0.57 0.1(10) (14) (11) (2) (11) (10) (11) (3) (14)
DEUT 4.19 1.07 -3.27 5.89 53.37 42.01 72.19 0.48 0.12(7) (11) (8) (8) (1) (5) (1) (8) (10)
HSBC 3.92 1.87 -3.75 6.46 13.21 35.25 13.37 0.44 0.09(15) (8) (15) (1) (15) (11) (13) (12) (15)
INGB 4.06 0.78 -3.19 6.27 39.475 51.21 44.12 0.56 0.12(12) (12) (7) (3) (6) (1) (6) (4) (6)
NDEA 3.92 0.71 -3.48 5.98 18.47 33.69 8.97 0.27 0.12(14) (13) (14) (7) (12) (13) (14) (14) (9)
RBOS 4.36 2.91 -3.06 5.69 42.05 38.37 55.55 0.34 0.12(4) (6) (1) (12) (4) (8) (4) (13) (11)
SCBL 4.19 1.24 -3.4 6.24 15.92 39.76 1.34 0.55 0.12(8) (10) (12) (5) (14) (7) (15) (5) (7)
SOGE 4.22 3.46 -3.12 5.62 38.39 42.74 37.43 0.66 0.16(5) (4) (2) (15) (7) (4) (8) (1) (1)
UBSW 4.08 0.43 -3.36 6.27 23.84 41.09 30.65 0.51 0.12(11) (15) (10) (4) (10) (6) (9) (6) (8)
UNCR 4.53 6.04 -3.13 5.62 27.75 34.75 21.47 0.47 0.13(2) (1) (3) (14) (9) (12) (10) (10) (2)
For each bank, the number gives the average risk during the period for the risk metric considered. The rank is
given below into parentheses. More risky banks have a rank closer to 1. The correspondence between the full
name of the bank and the code given here is provided in appendix A.
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banks, regulatory agencies, international organizations and financial institutions.
For each bank we measure foreign expansion in a year looking at the number of foreign unit
openings in that year. Foreign units refer to incorporated foreign banks or financial companies
with more than 50 percent ownership. We define an opening in a host country as a parent
bank applying one of the following growth strategies: ‘Organic growth’ by opening directly a
new foreign branch or subsidiary or increasing the activity of already-existing units; ‘Merger and
Acquisition’ through purchases of interest in local banks (ownership ≥ 50%) or takeovers; and
‘Joint ventures’. Therefore, we consider that a bank enters a foreign market whenever it opens
directly a branch or a subsidiary, or acquires, either directly or indirectly, a foreign entity, with at
least 50% ownership (see also Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga [27]). The opening would
take place in this case either by increasing own ownership in an already-controlled institution
or by acquiring a majority interest in a new one. We do not consider as an opening any new
institution resulting from the merger among previously-owned entities. The establishment of
representative offices, customer desks and the change of legal entity type (branch/subsidiary) are
disregarded as well. The parent bank is listed even if the opening was actually implemented by
a foreign unit owned by the bank.
Regarding the type of activities considered, our sample includes traditional retail and commer-
cial banking services, private and investment banking, asset and wealth management, financial
joint ventures, factoring companies performing pure commercial credit-related activities. The
type of activities that we consider is broader than the one normally collected for US bank, the
reason being that European banks follow a universal model and many of those non-retail activities
can have an impact on risk.15
Table 2 presents some summary statistics.16 We observe 852 openings in the period 2005-
2014. The countries with parent holdings expanding the most are Germany, France and the UK.
Comparing our banks with the Top 65 European banks in terms of assets reveals that our G-SIB
sample represents almost 40% of the assets of the Top 65 banks, with the average G-SIB bank
15We have also checked the robustness of our findings in two ways, by using a dummy for expansion instead
of a count variable (to control for possible miscounting of entries) and the full set of G-SIBs’ activities without
dropping any (such as real estate and holding companies). Results are qualitatively the same as reported in the
Online Appendix.
16Additional details on the construction of the dataset on foreign expansion can be found in Appendix A.
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being larger than the average Top 65 bank.17 In turn, the Top 65 banks account for roughly 60%
of the total assets of all active banks in Europe. Moreover, the G-SIB banks generate on average
two times more income than the average Top 65 bank. The quality of loans and the Capital ratio
are, instead, comparable.
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics: Banks included in the sample in 2014
Bank Country Total Assets Net income LLP K Ratio # Openings
HSBC UK 2634139 14135 1.25 15.6 2
Groupe BPCE France 1223298 1926 2.87 13.8 4
Standard Chartered UK 725914 3618 1.38 16.71 7
ING Bank Netherlands 992856 3778 1.14 14.58 10
Royal Bank of Scotland UK 1051019 -1316 4.97 17.1 13
Nordea Sweden 669342 2843 0.91 20.7 17
Credit Suisse Switzerland 921462 4070 0.28 20.8 18
UBS Switzerland 1062478 2723 0.22 25.6 19
Barclays UK 1357906 3811 1.26 16.5 31
Banco Santander Spain 1266296 7355 3.65 13.3 49
Societe Generale France 1308138 2896 4.31 14.3 77
Unicredit Italy 844217 2171 9.63 13.41 125
Deutschebank Germany 1708703 3761 1.27 17.2 139
Credit Agricole France 1589044 2751 3.04 18.4 143
BNP Paribas France 2077758 6030 3.85 12.6 198
Sum Top 65 48894842 130021 – – –
Average Top 65 752228 2000 2.76 16.99 –
Sum 19432570 60553 – – 852
Share of top 65 39.7 % 46.6 % – – –
Average 1295505 4037 2.67 16.71 57
St. dev. 530271.7 3380.9 2.446 3.530 63.7
Banks are ranked by total entries. Total assets and Net Income are expressed in millions of
dollars. LLP corresponds to the Loan-Loss provisions to total loans ratio, K ratio to the Capital
ratio, and # Openings to the total number of openings over the period. The top 65 includes the
15 banks in our sample and the top 50 largest European banks in terms of total assets (once the
banks in our sample are excluded).
3.3 Competition and Other Variables
As an inverse measure of competition we use the total assets Herfindahl Index for Credit
Institutions (HHI) collected from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and complemented by
17The Top 65 European banks consist of our 15 G-SIB banks plus the top 50 European banks in terms of total
assets once the G-SIB banks are excluded.
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the corresponding index calculated from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope data.
Our dataset also includes additional variables to be used as controls, all taken from Bureau
Van Dijk’s Bankscope: banks’ size as proxied by total assets; overall financial health and strength
as proxied alternatively by the Capital ratio and by the Tier1-to-assets ratio; banks’ profitability
as proxied by the Return on assets; diversification as proxied by income diversity
Income Diversity = 1− |Interest inc.− noninterest inc.|
Total income
and asset diversity
Asset Diversity = 1− |Loans−Other assets|
Total assets
.
Key descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3.18
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the main independent variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expansion 145 5.88 11.38 0 74
ln(Tot. Assets) 145 13.97 0.48 12.28 14.81
ROA 144 0.35 0.44 -1.61 1.14
Income diversity 144 0.71 0.49 -4.42 0.99
Asset diversity 144 0.71 0.19 0.23 1
Tier1/Assets 136 45.84 15.53 12.81 81.11
Deposits/Assets 144 652.33 162.19 251.37 1257.70
Finally, the dataset covers a number of geographical variables needed to instrument foreign
expansion as detailed below. These are lifted from the CEPII databases.19
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 displays a map of the actual expansion of G-SIBs in the potential destination coun-
tries. Looking at source countries, French banks are the ones expanding the most. This is due to
their sheer number. Out of 15 G-SIBs, 4 banks are French and 4 are from the United Kingdom. It
is also due to their acquisition of large banking groups. BNP Paribas acquired Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro in 2006 and Fortis in 2009. These two acquisitions resulted in large entries in foreign
markets by BNP Paribas. Despite the same number of G-SIB as France, the UK exhibits a
18Income diversity can be negative because of negative values for non-interest income.
19See http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6.
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lower number of foreign openings. Turning to host countries, we observe a large concentration
of openings in Western Europe. The host countries with the most openings are the UK, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg, reflecting their attractiveness for banking activities. Compared
with its neighbors, France is not a large entry destination for foreign banks. This may be due
to the large local activity of French banks. Overall, there are more openings in Western than
Eastern Europe.
Figure 1 – Expansion of banks in Europe (2005-2014)
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the 852 recorded openings in the period 2005-2014. The
top bank in terms of foreign openings is BNP Paribas, mainly due to its two large acquisitions
(Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and Fortis). Deutsche bank comes second also due to large acquisi-
tions such as Tilney in 2006 and Sal. Oppenheim in 2010. The third bank in terms of openings
is Credit Agricole with large acquisitions such as Fidis or Emporiki. Then comes Unicredit,
with a lot of openings in Eastern Europe following the acquisition of Bank Austria in 2007. The
remaining banks were less active in terms of acquisitions in Europe. Overall, Figure 2 reveals
large variation in the foreign expansion strategies of different banking groups.
Figure 3 and 4 present the average evolution of our individual and systemic risk metrics. For
ease of comparison, in Figure 3, the Z-score has been inverted so as to be increasing with risk
and the leverage ratio has been divided by ten for presentation purposes. In both figures, the
global trend of risk exhibits two peaks around 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. There are, however,
discrepancies among the different metrics. Looking at individual risk, the CDS spread and loan-
18
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Su
m
 o
f e
nt
rie
s
BN
PA
AG
RI
DE
UT
UN
CR
SO
GE
BS
CH
BA
RC
UB
SW
CR
ES
ND
EA
RB
OS ING
B
SC
BL
BP
CE
HS
BC
Figure 2 – Number of openings by banks.
loss provisions ratios show a permanent tendency to increase following the financial crisis after
the steeper rise of the former until 2008 and of the latter until 2009 for loan-loss provisions. On
the contrary, the standard deviation of returns, the Z-score and the leverage feature a fall after
the crisis peak, with only another peak in 2011 coinciding with the sovereign debt crisis.
In the case of systemic risk metrics, Figure 4 reveals close trends for long-run marginal
expected shortfall, SRISK and ∆ CoVaR computed using equity prices. The three measures
feature a dominant peak at the 2007-2008 financial crisis appears before, some exhibit a second
pick, albeit more muted, at the sovereign debt crisis. All in all, while risk measures share some
common features within categories (individual vs. systemic), there are fewer common points
between categories apart from the big peak around the financial crisis.
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Figure 4 – Systemic risk metrics
To illustrate the relationship between risk and openings between 2005 and 2014, Figure 5
depicts the trajectories of average CDS prices and of the sum of total openings from 2005 to
2014. The figure also shows the trajectories of the maximum and minimum CDS prices, revealing
that the evolution of risk follows qualitatively similar rising patterns for all banks. The number
of foreign entries globally decreases between 2005 and 2014, with a rebound in 2009 due to the
acquisition of Fortis by BNP Paribas. Figure 5 reveals a clear negative correlation between risk
and openings. However, it also hints at possible endogeneity: foreign expansion could explain
risk variation, but risk variation is also arguably a potential determinant of foreign expansion,
especially in coincidence of an important crisis episode.
4 Empirical Strategy
For the empirical analysis we proceed as follows. In this section we describe our methodology
and, in particular, our IV strategy. In Section 5 we present and comment the results on the rela-
tion between foreign expansion and risk-taking, using both individual risk metrics and systemic
ones. In Section 6 we check whether differences in the intensity of competition between host and
source markets play a role in explaining relation between foreign expansion and risk-taking as
predicted by the model in Section 2.
4.1 Specification
The basic empirical specification estimates by OLS an equation linking bank risk (either
individual or systemic), foreign expansion and a set of controls. Specifically, we consider bank k
headquartered in country i expanding to countries j 6= i in year t, and we start by estimating
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Figure 5 – A first look at entries and risk.
the following regression by OLS:
Riskinesskt = α + β1 · Expansionkt + Zkt · Γ + µk + µt + kt, (9)
where Riskinesskt refers to the (Naperian) logarithm of the bank’s average (individual or sys-
temic) risk metric over year t, Expansionkt =
∑
j 6=iOpeningskjt corresponds to its total number
of foreign openings, and Zkt is a set of control variables. In addition, we include time fixed effects
(µt) to control for specific trends in the data (including the crisis of 2007-2008). We also include
bank fixed effects (µk) to account for bank-specific factors that may influence risk. Because of
the inclusion of bank fixed effects, estimated coefficients capture within bank effects. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.20
4.2 Instrumental Variables
The OLS estimation described above could potentially be biased by a number of endogeneity
problems. First, the expansion decision itself could be driven by the banks’ risk profile. Banks
with risky portfolios might expand abroad in an attempt to diversify. Besides reverse causality,
20Ideally standards errors are best clustered at bank level. This would, however, require a larger sample. When
we ran regressions with that level of clustering, we obtained results that are overall in line with the ones we report
here (see Online Appendix).
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also the presence of confounding factors might induce endogeneity. For instance, the adoption
of a business model geared toward search for yield might jointly be responsible for investment
in risky asset portfolios and for the decision to expand. As a result, our OLS estimates of the
impact of expansion on risk might be upward biased.
We deal with this potential endogeneity bias by using a 2SLS strategy similar to the one
adopted by Goetz, Laeven and Levine [38] (hereafter GLL) and Levine Lin and Xi [45] (hereafter
LLX) in studies linking the volatility of equity prices for US banks with their cross-state expan-
sion. The strategy consists in instrumenting the observed geographic expansion of a bank with
the one predicted by a ‘gravity equation’. This method is akin to the one used by Frankel and
Romer [36], who study the impact of international trade on countries’ economic performance by
instrumenting the observed bilateral trade flows (which arguably depend on countries’ economic
performance) with the ones predicted by geographic variables and fixed country characteristics.
Specifically, our IV method can be described as follows. First, we compute the predicted bilat-
eral openings from a gravity regression of actual openings in country j by bank k headquartered
in country i at date t by estimating the following regression:
Openingskjt = Xkjt · β + νjt + νk + εkjt, (10)
where Xkjt are standard dyadic gravity variables (e.g. distance, common border, common lan-
guage, etc.), νjt is a destination country-time fixed effect and νk is a bank fixed effect.
Second, we aggregate the bilateral predicted openings across destinations to obtain a predic-
tion of the total number of openings of bank k at date t:
Expansionpredkt =
∑
j 6=i
(
Xkjt · β̂ + ν̂jt + ν̂k
)
. (11)
As an alternative, we will exclude all fixed effects as in GLL and LLX. We will use IV1 and
IV2 to refer to the instruments obtained from this alternative specification and from (10) respec-
tively. Moreover, we will also estimate a third specification including bank-time fixed effects νkt
instead of bank fixed effects νk and destination-country-time fixed effects νjt. However, since the
latter might be potentially correlated with bank risk, we will not use this third specification to
construct any instrument, but only for comparison with the gravity literature. All three specifi-
cations include log(distance), contiguity, official common language, common membership of the
European Union or the Eurozone, and difference in legal systems as regressors. Note that IV1
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has a very limited time variation (only generated through the Eurozone and the EU member-
ship variables), while IV2 is time-varying at the host-country level due to the fixed effects. In
particular these fixed effects account for the variations in the host-market economic, legal and
institutional conditions.
Given that our entry data are structured as count data, we are bound to estimate equation
(10) using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML hereafter). With count data, normal-
ity assumptions on estimators do not hold. Accordingly, OLS estimators are not appropriate,
whereas PPML are robust to distribution mis-specification (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [56]). As
it is standard in gravity models, we cluster standards errors at the country-pair level (Head and
Mayer [40]).
5 Empirical Results
We are now ready to look at our results. We start from gravity and then we turn to the
impacts of a bank’s foreign expansion on its individual and systemic risk metrics.
5.1 Gravity Prediction
Table 4 reports results for the gravity regression (10). As discussed earlier we test different
specifications with and without fixed effects. While more commonly used, the specification with
bank-time fixed effects may lead to instruments that depend on bank risk variation and are thus
not valid. The corresponding results are shown in column (1). The specification is analogous
to standard trade gravity estimations that include multilateral resistance terms, with the latter
proxyng the average barriers of a country with all its trade partners (Anderson and Van Wincoop
[8]; Head and Mayer [40]). For given bilateral barriers between two countries, i and j, higher
barriers between i and the rest of the world are likely to raise the number of new affiliates that
a bank headquartered in j opens in i. This specification serves mainly for comparison with
the literature on gravity equations. We do not use its predicted expansion as our instrument.
Our instruments are, instead, based on the specifications corresponding to the second and third
columns of Table 4. In particular, column (3) reports the results with bank and destination
country-time fixed effects while column (2) reports those without fixed effects.
In all columns of Table 4 the coefficients on distance are negative and significant. The
elasticity of openings to distance ranges from a minimum of −0.560 in column (3) to a maximum
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of −0.811 in column (2). These magnitudes are comparable with the ones found in other banking
gravity studies.21 Sharing a common language, being in the EU and the difference in the legal
systems do not have any significant impact. This might be explained by the fact that those
variables are collinear to distance. In column (2) being in the Eurozone fosters openings.
The predicted expansion based on the gravity estimates in columns (2) and (3) will be used
as our instruments, which we will call IV1 and IV2 respectively. Our preferred instrument will
be IV2.22 Being generated using bank (k) and hosting country-year (jt) fixed effects, it is more
accurate than IV1, making the predicted openings of the gravity equation more precise and time-
varying. Moreover, the exclusion of bank-time fixed effects makes it likely independent from bank
risk variation. We will, therefore, take IV2 as our baseline instrument, while using IV1 only to
make sure that our baseline results are not driven by potential correlation of the fixed effects in
IV2 with bank risk.
5.2 Expansion and Individual Risk
We now study the impact of foreign expansion on bank risk, comparing the OLS estimates
with the 2SLS ones that use IV1 and IV2 as alternative instruments. We start by examining indi-
vidual bank risk, using our market- and book-based metrics. Table 5 compares the corresponding
results. The first three columns give results without controls while columns (4) to (6) include
the following set of controls: ln(Total Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and
the Deposit-to-asset ratio. Note that the presentation of the table is not standard: the variable
in the left-hand side corresponds to the dependant variable while the independent variable is
always the bank expansion.23 Each regression includes bank and year fixed effects. The inclusion
of bank fixed effects in all specifications allows us to look at the relation within banks (‘within
21An earlier paper measuring the impact of geographical variables on cross-banking is Portes and Rey [52].
Buch [22] conducts similar analysis using data of foreign asset holdings of banks located in France, Germany, the
UK and the US. She finds an elasticity of 0.65 in 1999 that varies between 0.31 in France to 1.13 in Italy. Berger
et al. [14] propose a gravity analysis of bank expansion through M&A. They find a distance elasticity of 0.88
when they include host country and source country fixed effects. Finally, Claessens and Van Horen [28] study the
foreign location decisions of banks in a large number of countries in 2009.
22When the instrument is constructed as IV2, it is generated using out-of-sample prediction. Observations
that are always 0 for an origin-destination pair are dropped from the PPML estimation.
23In our online appendix we display the full tables.
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Table 4 – Banking gravity
(1) (2) (3)
PPML
Dep. var.: # of openings IV 1 IV 2
ln(Distance) -0.560** -0.811*** -0.569**
(0.247) (0.197) (0.253)
Contiguity 0.0245 1.086*** 0.114
(0.245) (0.300) (0.254)
Off. Com. Langu. 0.558 -0.518 0.577
(0.376) (0.386) (0.395)
Both in the EU 0.0410 0.0952 -0.0728
(0.572) (0.699) (0.604)
Both using Euro -0.667** 1.762*** -0.450
(0.332) (0.339) (0.335)
Diff. legal syst. 0.104 0.303 0.311
(0.310) (0.314) (0.283)
Observations 1,812 5,365 2,657
R-squared 0.569 0.036 0.351
Bank FE No No Yes
Bank × year FE Yes No No
Host country × year FE Yes No Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the Bank × Host
country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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effect’). This nets out any composition effect through which the observed relation between the
average riskiness of our banks and foreign expansion could be driven by the fact that banks with
different ex ante riskiness expand at different rates (‘between effect’). Time fixed effects account
for common time trends in the risk metrics. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed
effects. IV2 refers to the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects.
Results are reported sequentially in each row for CDS price, loan-loss provisions, the standard
deviation of returns, the Z-score and the leverage ratio.
The impact of expansion on risk is always negative and significant in most cases. The coeffi-
cient decreases and becomes more significant when we include the instrument and the controls.
Note that both instruments generate good F-stats in the first stage regressions, confirming that
they are not weak. In sum, for all individual risk metrics and for all set of controls and in-
strumental variables, we find a robust negative impact of foreign expansion on individual bank
risk.
The regressions based on our baseline instrument IV2 – in columns (3) and (6) – generate
estimates of intermediate magnitude between OLS and IV1-based 2SLS. In particular, column
(6) tells us that on average each new foreign opening by a bank decreases its CDS price by 1.5%,
its loan-loss provisions ratio by 0.027 percentage points, the standard deviation of the returns by
1%, increases the Z-score (which is inversely related to risk) by 0.89% and decreases the leverage
ratio by0.65 points of percentage. These effects correspond to the impact of one foreign opening
per year, the median number of openings per bank being two. For banks with number of openings
corresponding to the fourth quartile (those that open six foreign units a year), the cumulated
effect of their openings translates on average into a decrease of roughly 9% in the CDS spread,
0.162 percentage points in the loan-loss provisions ratio, roughly 6% in the standard deviation
of market returns, 3.9% in the leverage ratio and an increase of 5.3% in the Z-score.
To summarize, after its foreign expansion the market considers a bank as less risky in terms
of: asset and liability risk, as captured by smaller CDS spread, distance to default, as captured
by higher Z-score, and its ability to generate a stable income stream, as captured by smaller
standard deviation of returns. Moreover, foreign expansion induces the bank to set aside lower
loan-loss provisions, which implies that its self-assessed asset risk is also smaller. Finally, lower
leverage ratio suggests that foreign expansion also disciplines the liabilities side of the balance
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Table 5 – Individual risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Controls
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
First Stage 22.5495*** 1.6030*** 28.5419*** 1.7289***
(5.8428) (0.3526) (6.6751) (0.3806)
ln(CDS) -0.00463** -0.0258*** -0.0107*** -0.00473** -0.0274*** -0.0146***
(0.00189) (0.00908) (0.00366) (0.00191) (0.00789) (0.00446)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.964 0.934 0.962 0.972 0.936 0.965
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
LLP -0.00906 -0.0588** -0.0175 -0.00691 -0.0727*** -0.0273**
(0.0131) (0.0270) (0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0249) (0.0123)
Observations 143 143 143 135 135 135
R-squared 0.286 0.032 0.279 0.461 0.031 0.420
F-Test 1st 12.43 20.21 16.50 20.28
ln(σ returns)-0.00339** -0.0186*** -0.00781*** -0.00381** -0.0190*** -0.00991***
(0.00143) (0.00650) (0.00291) (0.00157) (0.00547) (0.00303)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.894 0.823 0.888 0.909 0.832 0.896
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
ln(Z-score) 0.00429** 0.0238*** 0.00785** 0.00434** 0.0221*** 0.00887***
(0.00195) (0.00765) (0.00320) (0.00153) (0.00655) (0.00269)
Observations 135 134 134 135 134 134
R-squared 0.842 0.718 0.838 0.885 0.784 0.879
F-Test 1st 17.93 19.58 20.99 20.63
Leverage -0.244** -0.982*** -0.519*** -0.289 -0.959*** -0.647***
(0.108) (0.323) (0.161) (0.169) (0.256) (0.205)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.583 0.400 0.558 0.651 0.484 0.604
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first stage regressions are the ones with ln(CDS) as
risk metric in the 2SLS estimation (for other metrics the first stage statistics could be slightly
different as the number of observations could be different). Each regression includes bank and
year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to
the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total
Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p
<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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sheet risk.24
5.3 Expansion and Systemic Risk
There are several reasons why international expansion may cause an increase in systemic risk.
First, new entrants in the market tend to increase the degree of interconnections in the system
thereby fostering direct contagion channels. Second, by investing in local loans, they increase
the degree of asset commonality. New entrants may also obtain short-term funds from the local
deposit market and provide short-term funds to the local interbank market. All this implies that
the new entrant may be exposed to the same funding risk as the local banks in each destination
country, and may also potentially contribute to spread liquidity risk.
To see whether this is the case, Table 6 mirrors Table 5 for systemic rather than individual
risk metrics: the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES), the conditional capital short-
fall (SRISK), and the ∆CoVaR computed using either CDS prices or equity prices. For three risk
measures (LRMES, SRISK and ∆CoVaR computed with equity prices) there is a negative and
significant causal effect of international expansion on systemic risk with remarkable consistency
across the different measures. The impact of expansion on ∆CoVaR computed with CDS is
generally negative, but not significant.
Our conclusion is that in our sample of European banks there is strong and robust evidence
that banks’ foreign expansion decreases risk, not only from an individual viewpoint but also from
a systemic viewpoint.
6 Expansion and Competition
Having established the negative impact of foreign expansion on bank risk, we now examine
whether this impact can be explained by different intensities of competition between source and
host markets as predicted by the model presented in Section 2. To do so, for each parent holding
we create two groups of openings depending on whether the intensity of competition (as measured
by the total assets Herfindahl Index for Credit Institutions, or HHI) in the host country is higher
or lower than in the source country. This procedure allows us to exploit the variation in the
24A channel through which global banks can reduce runnable liabilities is cross-border liquidity management.
For instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg [25]) find that large global groups optimally manage internal liquidity by
swiftly shifting it to where it is most needed. This reduces the need of raising runnable liabilities locally.
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Table 6 – Systemic risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Control Set 1
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
LRMES -0.136 -0.452* -0.189* -0.151 -0.499*** -0.193*
(0.147) (0.243) (0.101) (0.144) (0.190) (0.105)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.622 0.519 0.620 0.663 0.537 0.661
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
SRISK -0.320 -1.622*** -0.904*** -0.350 -1.605*** -0.989***
(0.266) (0.481) (0.256) (0.281) (0.374) (0.318)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.664 0.326 0.596 0.726 0.401 0.641
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
∆ CoVaR CDS -0.000736 -0.00289 -0.00139 -0.000369 -0.000601 -0.000939
(0.00145) (0.00417) (0.00150) (0.00135) (0.00342) (0.00139)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.687 0.680 0.686 0.745 0.745 0.745
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
∆ CoVaR Equ. -0.000221 -0.00280*** -0.000860** -0.000259 -0.00262*** -0.00104**
(0.000248) (0.000963) (0.000329) (0.000280) (0.000810) (0.000399)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.852 0.711 0.843 0.855 0.730 0.841
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank fixed effects and year fixed
effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to the instrument
generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income
Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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degree of competition across HHI groups and countries. Using the gravity predictions we made
before (only for IV2 with bank and host-year fixed effects, for ease of presentation), we obtain two
corresponding groups of predicted openings based on IV2: predicted openings in host countries
with HHI lower or higher than the source country.25
According to our model, the competition channel is at work whenever the impact of foreign
expansion on bank risk differs between the two (instrumented) groups of openings. Moreover,
the ‘margin effect’ of competition dominates (is dominated by) its ‘scale effect’ whenever risk
falls more for expansion to host countries with lower (higher) intensity of competition, i.e. higher
(lower) HHI than the source country.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for individual and systemic risk measures respectively. In
particular, Table 7 shows that the competition channel is indeed at work, and this is due to a
dominant ‘margin effect’, in the case of loan-loss provisions, the standard deviation of returns
and the Z-score: the estimated coefficients on openings in lower HHI host countries are not
statistically different from zero, whereas those in higher HHI host countries are negative (although
not statistically significant for LLP). Differently, in the case of CDS the opposite pattern holds:
estimated coefficients on openings in higher HHI host countries are not statistically different
from zero, while those in lower HHI host countries are negative and statistically significant. This
discrepancy may be explained by the fact that the CDS tends to price the risk of the parent
holding more than the risk of affiliated banks in specific markets. The regressions with leverage do
not reveal a significant difference between expansion in competitive and not competitive markets.
As for systemic risk, the results reported in Table 8 are more mixed. They still generally in-
dicate that risk falls with openings, particularly so for openings in countries with higher intensity
25In their study of the effects of competition on bank risk across US states, Jiang, Levine and Lin (2017) enrich
the gravity instrument exploiting the fact that individual states began interstate deregulation in different years
and followed different dynamic paths from 1982 until the Riegle-Neal Act eliminated restrictions on interstate
banking in 1995. In particular, for each state and each year, they measure which other state’s banks can establish
subsidiaries in its borders obtaining state-year measures of the competitive pressures facing a state’s banking
system. They then integrate these state-year interstate bank deregulation measures with the gravity model to
differentiate among banks within a state and construct time-varying, bank-specific competition indices. In the case
of our sample their procedure is hard to implement as we cover the period 2005-2014 and changes in regulation for
European countries took place only around 2014 after the creation of the banking union and the implementation
of the banking directives (when changes started to happen almost contemporaneously in all countries).
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Table 7 – Testing for the competition channel – Individual risk metrics.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls Controls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ln(CDS)
Open. in countries with lower HHI -0.0112* -0.0193*** -0.0137** -0.0291***
(0.00554) (0.00649) (0.00468) (0.00767)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.000200 -0.00381 0.000948 -0.00300
(0.00483) (0.00730) (0.00360) (0.00603)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.965 0.963 0.973 0.967
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
LLP
Open. in countries with lower HHI 0.0357 0.0438* 0.0269 0.00689
(0.0245) (0.0259) (0.0208) (0.0261)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.0400 -0.0670** -0.0342 -0.0529**
(0.0239) (0.0318) (0.0243) (0.0257)
Observations 143 143 135 135
R-squared 0.325 0.300 0.513 0.477
F-Test 1st 10.16 12.49
ln(σ returns)
Open. in countries with lower HHI 0.00202 0.000594 0.00196 -0.00544
(0.00302) (0.00543) (0.00256) (0.00609)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.00707** -0.0145*** -0.00797*** -0.0133***
(0.00287) (0.00465) (0.00193) (0.00435)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.896 0.887 0.911 0.899
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
ln(Z-score)
Open. in countries with lower HHI -0.00540 -0.00435 -0.00333 0.00290
(0.00450) (0.00607) (0.00372) (0.00583)
Open. in countries with higher HHI 0.0108*** 0.0175*** 0.00972*** 0.0134***
(0.00345) (0.00607) (0.00146) (0.00436)
Observations 135 134 135 134
R-squared 0.848 0.841 0.889 0.882
F-Test 1st 10.75 13.20
Leverage
Open. in countries with lower HHI -0.205 -0.300 -0.175 -0.654*
(0.298) (0.303) (0.300) (0.352)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.271 -0.694** -0.339* -0.640**
(0.207) (0.316) (0.178) (0.323)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.583 0.552 0.662 0.611
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank and year fixed effects. IV2 refers
to the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total
Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and Deposit-to-asset ratio, Average MPI in en-
tering countries and Average comovement in entering countries. The two last variables are introduced
to control for diversification and regulation channels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.131
Table 8 – Testing for the competition channel – Systemic risk metrics.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls Controls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
LRMES
Open. in countries with lower HHI -0.246 -0.568** -0.194 -0.552*
(0.401) (0.284) (0.371) (0.279)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.0618 0.115 -0.106 0.0890
(0.101) (0.105) (0.111) (0.129)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.625 0.607 0.675 0.653
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
SRISK
Open. in countries with lower HHI -0.412 -0.976** -0.459 -1.397***
(0.574) (0.437) (0.528) (0.496)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.257 -0.847* -0.278 -0.654
(0.330) (0.450) (0.255) (0.484)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.665 0.598 0.734 0.656
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
∆CoVaR CDS
Open. in countries with lower HHI 0.00852** 0.00423 0.00889** 0.00396
(0.00288) (0.00338) (0.00403) (0.00349)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.00702*** -0.00588*** -0.00694*** -0.00475***
(0.00210) (0.00213) (0.00162) (0.00164)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.711 0.706 0.773 0.767
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
∆CoVaR Equ.
Open. in countries with lower HHI 9.75e-05 0.000544 -7.27e-05 -6.45e-06
(0.000620) (0.000632) (0.000680) (0.000708)
Open. in countries with higher HHI -0.000438 -0.00198*** -0.000389 -0.00185***
(0.000451) (0.000583) (0.000454) (0.000573)
Observations 145 145 136 136
R-squared 0.852 0.835 0.856 0.837
F-Test 1st 11.15 13.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank and year fixed effects. IV2 refers to
the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income
Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and Deposit-to-asset ratio, Average MPI in entering countries and Average
comovement in entering countries. The two last variables are introduced to control for diversification and
regulation channels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of competition, but a robust (opposite) pattern emerges only for the CoVaR measures. However,
more nuanced results for systemic than individual measures are to be expected as systemic risk
is more likely to be affected by a number of country characteristics that go beyond and above
the differential intensity of competition between source and host markets.
7 Conclusion
How bank globalization affects risk is an open question. In the run-up to the 2007-2008
financial crisis banks around the world had been loading too much risk on their balance sheets.
Banks’ risk-taking has been attributed to two main causes: lax monetary policy and banking
globalization.
An extensive literature has studied the role of expansionary monetary policy for banks’ risk-
taking. Based on data from single countries and risk measures at the individual bank level, a
consensus has emerged that low interest rates can trigger banks’ risk-taking. Differently, studies
on banking globalization are more divided as they do not examine the role of global banks for
risk-taking directly.
We have contributed to this body of knowledge in three ways. First, we have provided a deeper
investigation of the impact of banks’ foreign expansion on risk-taking both from individual and
systemic viewpoints. Second, we have studied a someway neglected channel through which banks’
foreign expansion may affect risk-taking when national banking markets differ in terms of the
intensity of competition. Third, in doing so, we have assembled a rich cross-country dataset on
global banks’ foreign expansion including their main characteristics as well as key features of
their countries of operation.
To organize the different moving parts of our empirical analysis, we have proposed a simple
static model showing that whether risk-taking increases when a bank expands its operations
in a foreign market depends on whether the probability of no default in that market is higher
or lower than in its home market. This in turn depends on whether the number of competing
banks is different between the two markets. However, two opposite effects of competition on
risk-taking imply that whether a larger number of banks is associated with more or less risk-
taking is ambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint. On the one hand, for a given loan-deposit
margin, a larger number of banks leads to more loans and deposits, which in itself would raise
the probability of no default (‘scale effect’). On the other hand, a larger number of banks
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decreases the loan-deposit margin, which in itself would reduce the probability of no default
(‘margin effect’).
Using data on the 15 European banks classified as G-SIBs covering a 10-year time period
from 2005 to 2014, we have found that the impact of foreign expansion on risk is always negative
and significant for most individual and systemic risk metrics. In the case of individual metrics,
we have also found that the competition channel is indeed at work. This happens through a
dominant ‘margin effect’ as the estimated coefficients on openings in lower HHI host countries
are not statistically different from zero whereas those in higher HHI host countries tend to
be negative. As for systemic risk, our findings are mixed and this can be explained by the
fact that systemic risk is more likely to be affected by a number of country or business model
characteristics that go beyond and above the differential intensity of competition between source
and host markets.
As our period of observation includes the 2007-2008 financial crisis, it is useful to further
discuss how we have taken the crisis’s impact and the related policy responses into account.
Moreover, as our evidence is based on European banking groups, some discussion is warranted on
how the European banking system evolved during this period, also in relation to the developments
observed in the US. First and foremost, to make sure that the financial crisis and its policy
responses do not drive our results, all our regressions control for a common time trend (‘time
fixed effect’). Second, one may argue that our emphasis on banks’ openings neglects the possible
impact of banks’ exits, which could be sizeable following a financial crisis. We have checked this
issue by collecting data on exits. We have found that they are in much fewer than openings and
controlling for them does not make any difference as the corresponding coefficients turn out to be
statistically insignificant. The reason is that data on exits are very noisy and possibly distorted
by the fact that in most cases we do not observe a true exit but just a change of bank name or a
restructuring. Yet, the relatively small number of exits we observe is in line with the fact that in
the aftermath of the crisis de-banking has been mild in Europe and much more contained than
in the US.26 In some regressions we also control for indicators of macro-prudential policy. Our
26Exits in Europe have been less than a third of those in the US (ESRB [33]). Sales of affiliates by European
GSIBs happened mainly in countries outside Europe as this is their core market. Sales of affiliates were instead
much more common among smaller banks. A well known case is the sale of Austria’s Volksbank operations in
eight Eastern European countries to Sberbank. No significant case can be detected for GSIBs.
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results are robust to those controls.27
A final comment concerns the relation between banking concentration and the likelihood or
the severity of the financial crisis. After the crisis governments pushed for consolidation with
no clear evidence on whether consolidation is good or bad for risk. First, as noted in Vives
[60], some countries with concentrated banking system such as Belgium, the Netherlands and
the UK (but also Germany and Italy) have suffered severely from the crisis. This is indicative
of the fact that concentration might not be good for stability. Second, a recent report by the
ESRB [33] using data for 195 banks for the period 1994-2012 finds that a system characterized
by large and universal banks (hence likely concentrated) is correlated with higher systemic risk.
To properly account for the universal nature of the European banks, our data on foreign entries
include activities such as insurance and factoring that go beyond strict retail banking, but still
contribute to riskiness. This has allowed us to avoid underestimating bank risk while casting a
shadow on consolidation as necessarily risk-reducing.
27Policy responses might have opposite effects on risk and as such they might offset each other. Consider first
prudential policy. On the one hand, stricter regulatory requirements or bail-in policies might increase barrier to
entry, reduce profitability and increase insolvency. On the other hand, imposing higher loss absorption capacity
drives down the market pricing of risk and banks’ risk-taking incentives. In the aftermath of the crisis there have
been also some bail-outs. Those can also have opposite effects. Ex ante the presence of an implicit government
guarantee might drive the market pricing of risk, however ex post bail-outs foster moral hazard, hence banks’
risk-taking.
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A Data Description
Our analysis exploits a novel dataset providing the number of foreign affiliates opening for
the 15 biggest G-SIBs banks in Europe between 2005 and 2014. We consider the following banks:
Banco Santander (BSCH), Barclays (BARC), BNP Paribas (BNPA), BPCE Groupe (BPCE),
Credit Suisse (CRES), Credit Agricole (AGRI), Deutschebank (DEUT), HSBC , ING Direct
(INGB), Nordea (NDEA), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBOS), Société Générale (SOGE), Standard
Chartered (SCBL), UBS (UBSW) and UniCredit (UNCR). We identify 38 destination countries:
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United King-
dom. The panel is balanced, as we consider for each bank all potential host countries and years; if
a bank did not establish an affiliate in a foreign country in a given year, the count of its openings
is assumed to be equal to zero.
We combined many data sources, the two main sources being the banks’ annual reports and
ORBIS vintages. Orbis provides the vintages of the fiscal years 2008 to 2014 (the access to
these vintages is restricted to a 10-years time window). The data provided by Orbis includes a
wide range of subsidiaries, such as banks, financial companies, insurance companies, corporate
companies, mutual and pension funds, private equity firms and others. In order to keep track
of only the most relevant affiliates, we filtered the data keeping only the subsidiaries for which
the bank had a level of ownership greater than or equal to 50%. We also adjusted the names of
the entities observed when it was necessary to ensure consistency of the dataset over time, since
banks’ names may change, especially following an acquisition episode.
In order to complement Orbis data with older entities from 2004 (in order to register entries
in 2005), we manually collected majority-owned foreign affiliates lists from annual reports of the
banks. To deal with incomplete reports, we use several other sources such as SEC fillings, the
Claessens and Van Horen database of Bank Ownership (hereafter CvH),28 internet websites of
the banks, press reports, etc. The CvH database provides ownership information for 5,498 banks
active in 139 countries over the period 1995-2013. We manually assigned these banks to their
28Available at: https://www.dnb.nl/en/onderzoek-2/databases/bank.jsp
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global ultimate owner to track the information about foreign entry of the 15 GSIB considered in
this paper. We extended the coverage using annual reports.
In order to harmonize the sources and limit possible inaccuracies in reporting, we dropped the
affiliates specialized in real estate activities as well as those specialized in leasing activities. We
also reviewed manually the database containing affiliates names to avoid any double counting.
Double counting may occur if an entity changes name during the period studied and between
the different sources. We also had to control for the entry of holding companies. For example:
if Bank A enters a market (say country C) with retail banking and insurance activities, it may
open three entities named: "Bank A Holdings in C", "Bank A Retail Banking" and "Bank A
Insurance". In this case we only kept the two last entities in our database. We also dropped
identified trust and shelf companies. Finally, we dropped all entities located in UK’s oversea
territories such as Jersey, Guernsey, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, etc. BPCE bank is only
considered from its date of creation in 2009.
This gives us a dataset where an observation corresponds to an affiliate of a G-SIB European
bank k (headquartered in country i), registered in country j (with j 6= i). We have access to the
presence of this affiliate between 2004 and 2015. We register an entry whenever we record the
first entry in the period. Considering that entry, followed by an exit and a new entry of the same
entity is very rare, we do not consider ‘new entries’ since they may be due to our data sources
rather than a true activity of the bank. We then sum for each bank k in destination country j
the number of openings in a given year. With 8 home countries, 38 destinations and 10 years,
we end up with a balanced dataset of 5550 observed (foreign) Openingskjt for j 6= i and 145
observed Expansionkt =
∑
j 6=iOpeningskjt.
B Systemic Risk Metrics
In this paper, we use four different metrics for systemic risk: the long-run marginal expected
shortfall, the SRISK metric and the ∆ CoVaR computed using two different methods. We will
first briefly describe the construction of each metric and then highlight common points and
differences.
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B.1 Long-Run Marginal Expected Shortfall
The Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and its long-run version (LRMES) has been intro-
duced in the seminal papers of Acharya et al. [2] and Brownlees and Engle [20]. The MES
corresponds to the firm’s expected equity loss following the fall of the market under a given
threshold. It is defined as a 2% market drop in one day for the MES and as a 40% market drop
over six months for the LRMES. The LRMES will give the marginal contribution of a bank to
the systemic risk following the market decline. Formally, the LRMES for bank i, in a market M
and cumulative returns between t and t+6 Ri,t:t+6 is:
LRMESi,t:t+6 = −E [Ri,t:t+6|RM,t:t+6 ≤ −40%] (12)
Higher LRMES corresponds to a higher contribution of the bank to the systemic risk. Our
measure of LRMES comes from the Center for Risk Management of Lausanne and has been
computed following methods adapted for European banks (see Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger,
2012). The construction of LRMES combines DCC, GARCH and copula models.
B.2 SRISK
This measure has been proposed by Acharya, Engle and Richardson [1] and Brownless and
Engle [20]. The SRISK is based on MES but takes into account the liabilities and the size of the
bank. Following Acharya, Engle and Richardson [1] and Benoit et al. [13], SRISK is defined as:
LRMESit = max
[
0; [kLit − 1 + (1− k)LRMESit]Wit
]
(13)
with k being the prudential capital ratio, Lit, the leverage of the bank and Wit the market
capitalization.
This definition highlights that SRISK increases with the market capitalization and the lever-
age.
B.3 ∆ CoVaR
The ∆CoVaR measure has been proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier [3]. The CoVaR
corresponds to "the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional on institutions being
under financial distress". The ∆CoVaR is then defined as the difference between the CoVaR
when bank i is under distress and the CoVaR when bank i is in its median state.
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The V aR(p), the VaR at the confidence level p is defined as the loss in market value that is
exceeded with a probability 1− p in a given period. For instance the V aR(5%) = x corresponds
to an expected loss lower than x in 95% of the cases. Formally V aR(p) of the market return ri
is defined as:
P(ri ≤ V aRi(p)) = p (14)
The CoVaR is defined as the VaR of a bank conditional on some event C(ri) affecting bank
i returns:
P(ri ≤ CoV aRi|C(ri)(p)|C(ri)) = p (15)
The ∆CoVaR is then computed as the difference between the CoVaR when the loss is equal
to the VaR (distress event) and the CoVaR in a normal situation (defined as the median return):
CoV aRi|rit=V aRit(p) − CoV aRi|rit=Median(rit) (16)
This definition of the ∆CoVaR allows its estimation using simple quantile regressions techniques.
We estimate the ∆CoVaR for our 15 banks following the methodology and the codes of Adrian
and Brunnermeier [3]. As ∆CoVaR can be estimated using returns on equity or on CDS, we
choose to compute both.
The ∆CoVaR extends the VaR measure to take into account the contribution of each in-
stitution to the overall risk in the market. The metric is especially designed to compare the
contribution of different banks to the systemic risk. As stated by Adrian and Brunnermeier [3]
the ∆CoVaR is not equivalent to the VaR.
B.4 Comparison
As stated by Benoit et al. [13] no systemic risk metric covers all the dimensions of systemic
risk. Each different metric takes into account different features of the systemic risk than other
might not consider. Based on this remark we can state that the three different systemic risk
metrics used in this paper are complementary.
A key difference between the LRMES and the SRISK metrics is the implicit paradigm of
systemic risk. The LRMES naturally increases for interconnected institutions. This corresponds
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to the too-interconnected-to-fail paradigm. On the contrary, the SRISK weights the systemic
risk by the size and the leverage of the bank. It is then closer to the too-big-to-fail paradigm (see
Benoit et al. [13]). Despite having similar trends, these two measures are weighted differently
and reveal different aspects of systemic risk.
According to Benoit et al. [13], the conditions under which ∆CoVaR and LRMES and
∆CoVaR and SRISK provide similar rankings of systemic risk are restrictive. They confirm this
in their empirical analysis where they observe that rankings of riskiness based on ∆CoVaR seems
un-correlated with other rankings. This is confirmed in our sample as well.
B.5 Data Sources
As for data sources, CDS prices come from Bloomberg and equity prices from Datastream.
Both are averaged to obtain monthly (for computing ∆Covar) and yearly (as left-hand side
variables) measures. The LRMES and the SRISK metrics are taken from the Centre for Risk
Analysis of Lausanne and correspond to a yearly average using four values by year.29 Concerning
the variables used as states in the ∆CoVaR estimation: the VIX is taken from the Chicago
Boards Option Exchange; the S&P composite index from Datastream; the Moody’s Seasoned
Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, the three-
months yield, the ten-years yield and the LIBOR rate come from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Saint Louis. All these variables are averaged to obtain monthly values.
29The results are robust to redefining the annual LRMES/SRISK as the one at the end of December.
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Figures 6 to 14 correspond to the eight risk metrics. CDS prices, loan-loss provisions, volatility
of returns, Z-score, SRISK, LRMES and ∆CoVaR EQU have similar trends with peaks in 2009
and 2013. The trend of the ∆CoVaR CDS is a bit different with a peak only in 2009. The
loan-loss provisions to total loans, for which we only have annual measures, has an increasing
trend from 2007 to 2014.
Table 9 presents the correlation between each risk metrics.
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Table 9 – Correlation between risk metrics
ln(CDS) LLP ln(σ returns) ln(Z-score) LRMES SRISK ∆ CoVaR ∆ CoVaR Equ Leverage
ln(CDS) 1 – – – – – – – –
LLP 0.3506 1 – – – – – – –
ln(σ returns) 0.675 0.27 1 – – – – – –
ln(Z-score) -0.4904 -0.3586 -0.925 1 – – – – –
LRMES 0.6026 0.1021 0.5941 -0.4446 1 – – – –
SRISK 0.5156 0.2373 0.6135 -0.5423 0.5946 1 – – –
∆ CoVaR -0.1561 -0.1317 0.2287 -0.311 0.0816 -0.0108 1 – –
∆ CoVaR Equ 0.5081 0.1908 0.8149 -0.7658 0.4614 0.3978 0.1417 1 –
Leverage 0.5491 0.2236 0.6935 -0.6219 0.5192 0.8818 0.0365 0.505 1
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A Full Tables
Table 1 – Dependant variable: ln(CDS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.00463** -0.0258*** -0.0107*** -0.00473** -0.0274*** -0.0146***
(0.00189) (0.00908) (0.00366) (0.00191) (0.00789) (0.00446)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.0222 0.102 0.0318
(0.180) (0.169) (0.135)
ROA -0.209*** -0.216** -0.212***
(0.0648) (0.0885) (0.0679)
Income diversity -0.0388 -0.00905 -0.0259
(0.0378) (0.0640) (0.0465)
Asset diversity -0.294 -0.0707 -0.197
(0.471) (0.403) (0.328)
Tier1/Asset -0.00214 -0.000368 -0.00137
(0.00825) (0.00597) (0.00517)
Deposits/Asset -0.000505* -0.000630 -0.000560**
(0.000265) (0.000459) (0.000275)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.964 0.934 0.962 0.972 0.936 0.965
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2
Table 2 – Dependant variable: Loan-Loss Provisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.00906 -0.0588** -0.0175 -0.00691 -0.0727*** -0.0273**
(0.0131) (0.0270) (0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0249) (0.0123)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.490 -0.129 -0.378
(0.880) (0.499) (0.473)
ROA -0.835** -0.854* -0.841*
(0.283) (0.453) (0.459)
Income diversity 0.0680 0.155 0.0949
(0.117) (0.230) (0.191)
Asset diversity -1.336 -0.823 -1.177
(1.052) (1.039) (0.885)
Tier1/Asset 0.00832 0.0145 0.0102
(0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0141)
Deposits/Asset -0.00241*** -0.00271* -0.00250***
(0.000786) (0.00156) (0.000945)
Observations 143 143 143 135 135 135
R-squared 0.286 0.032 0.279 0.461 0.031 0.420
F-Test 1st 12.43 20.21 16.50 20.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3
Table 3 – Dependant variable: ln(σ returns)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.00339** -0.0186*** -0.00781*** -0.00381** -0.0190*** -0.00991***
(0.00143) (0.00650) (0.00291) (0.00157) (0.00547) (0.00303)
ln(Tot Assets) 0.114 0.197 0.147
(0.245) (0.128) (0.127)
ROA -0.164*** -0.169** -0.166***
(0.0387) (0.0659) (0.0499)
Income diversity -0.0255 -0.00553 -0.0175
(0.0254) (0.0296) (0.0218)
Asset diversity 0.0918 0.242 0.152
(0.237) (0.244) (0.199)
Tier1/Asset 0.00135 0.00254 0.00183
(0.00697) (0.00478) (0.00469)
Deposits/Asset -0.000396** -0.000480 -0.000430
(0.000184) (0.000368) (0.000266)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.894 0.823 0.888 0.909 0.832 0.896
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4
Table 4 – Dependant variable: ln(Z-score)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion 0.00429** 0.0238*** 0.00785** 0.00434** 0.0221*** 0.00887***
(0.00195) (0.00765) (0.00320) (0.00153) (0.00655) (0.00269)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.212 -0.320** -0.240*
(0.247) (0.136) (0.132)
ROA 0.287*** 0.292*** 0.288***
(0.0479) (0.0805) (0.0610)
Income diversity 0.00804 -0.0169 0.00169
(0.0307) (0.0444) (0.0303)
Asset diversity 0.227 0.0189 0.174
(0.247) (0.307) (0.236)
Tier1/Asset -0.00112 -0.00240 -0.00145
(0.00770) (0.00532) (0.00500)
Deposits/Asset 0.000116 0.000224 0.000144
(0.000191) (0.000386) (0.000243)
Observations 135 134 134 135 134 134
R-squared 0.842 0.718 0.838 0.885 0.784 0.879
F-Test 1st 17.93 19.58 20.99 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5
Table 5 – Dependant variable: Leverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.244** -0.982*** -0.519*** -0.289 -0.959*** -0.647***
(0.108) (0.323) (0.161) (0.169) (0.256) (0.205)
ln(Tot Assets) 16.07 19.72** 18.02**
(11.71) (8.129) (8.118)
ROA -7.174** -7.370** -7.279***
(2.676) (3.262) (2.735)
Income diversity 1.252 2.131 1.721
(1.480) (1.871) (1.465)
Asset diversity 16.42 23.01* 19.93
(15.82) (13.51) (12.50)
Tier1/Asset 0.372 0.424 0.399
(0.377) (0.297) (0.302)
Deposits/Asset -0.0377** -0.0414** -0.0397**
(0.0141) (0.0201) (0.0167)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.583 0.400 0.558 0.651 0.484 0.604
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6
Table 6 – Dependant variable: LRMES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.136 -0.452* -0.189* -0.151 -0.499*** -0.193*
(0.147) (0.243) (0.101) (0.144) (0.190) (0.105)
ln(Tot Assets) -1.405 0.490 -1.177
(6.709) (5.613) (5.069)
ROA -0.979 -1.081 -0.991
(1.535) (1.957) (1.504)
Income diversity -1.588 -1.133 -1.533
(1.243) (1.115) (1.046)
Asset diversity 14.13 17.55 14.54
(11.75) (11.14) (10.51)
Tier1/Asset -0.256 -0.229 -0.253*
(0.183) (0.148) (0.136)
Deposits/Asset 0.000504 -0.00141 0.000274
(0.00704) (0.0105) (0.00653)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.622 0.519 0.620 0.663 0.537 0.661
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7 – Dependant variable: SRISK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.320 -1.622*** -0.904*** -0.350 -1.605*** -0.989***
(0.266) (0.481) (0.256) (0.281) (0.374) (0.318)
ln(Tot Assets) 14.17 21.02** 17.66*
(18.12) (9.926) (9.347)
ROA -10.49* -10.86* -10.68**
(5.938) (6.494) (5.182)
Income diversity -1.653 -0.00774 -0.815
(2.433) (2.580) (1.801)
Asset diversity 21.24 33.58* 27.53*
(20.60) (19.70) (16.11)
Tier1/Asset -0.0760 0.0219 -0.0261
(0.533) (0.333) (0.313)
Deposits/Asset -0.0259 -0.0328 -0.0294
(0.0253) (0.0341) (0.0253)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.664 0.326 0.596 0.726 0.401 0.641
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
8
Table 8 – Dependant variable: ∆ CoVaR CDS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.000736 -0.00289 -0.00139 -0.000369 -0.000601 -0.000939
(0.00145) (0.00417) (0.00150) (0.00135) (0.00342) (0.00139)
ln(Tot Assets) 0.0186 0.0198 0.0217
(0.0807) (0.0586) (0.0602)
ROA -0.0487 -0.0487 -0.0488
(0.0441) (0.0418) (0.0417)
Income diversity -0.0965*** -0.0962*** -0.0958***
(0.0285) (0.0282) (0.0279)
Asset diversity -0.0956 -0.0934 -0.0900
(0.245) (0.164) (0.167)
Tier1/Asset -0.00525 -0.00523* -0.00520*
(0.00401) (0.00272) (0.00275)
Deposits/Asset 0.000306** 0.000305** 0.000303**
(0.000108) (0.000134) (0.000135)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.687 0.680 0.686 0.745 0.745 0.745
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9 – Dependant variable: ∆ CoVaR Equ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
Expansion -0.000221 -0.00280*** -0.000860** -0.000259 -0.00262*** -0.00104**
(0.000248) (0.000963) (0.000329) (0.000280) (0.000810) (0.000399)
ln(Tot Assets) 0.00599 0.0189 0.0103
(0.0315) (0.0203) (0.0186)
ROA -0.0135** -0.0142 -0.0138**
(0.00526) (0.00920) (0.00662)
Income diversity 0.0173*** 0.0204*** 0.0183***
(0.00411) (0.00731) (0.00529)
Asset diversity -0.0288 -0.00560 -0.0211
(0.0431) (0.0373) (0.0318)
Tier1/Asset 0.000346 0.000530 0.000407
(0.000798) (0.000745) (0.000695)
Deposits/Asset -2.92e-05 -4.22e-05 -3.35e-05
(2.36e-05) (5.04e-05) (3.06e-05)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.852 0.711 0.843 0.855 0.730 0.841
F-Test 1st 14.89 20.67 18.28 20.63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Robustness tests
B.1 Clustering strategy
In the baseline tables, the standard errors are only robust to heteroskedasticity. We also apply
a small sample correction. One could argue that the standards errors need to be clustered at the
bank level. Such clustering strategy would give us 15 cluster groups which could be considered
as too small to provide consistent estimates. Nevertheless, we provide here a replication of tables
5 and 6 where we cluster the standards errors at the bank level.
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Table 10 – Individual risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Controls
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
First Stage 22.5495** 1.6030*** 28.5419*** 1.7289***
(9.7088) (0.3658) (9.9771) (0.2859)
ln(CDS) -0.00463** -0.0258* -0.0107* -0.00473** -0.0274** -0.0146***
(0.00189) (0.0144) (0.00530) (0.00191) (0.0106) (0.00432)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
LLP -0.00906 -0.0588 -0.0175 -0.00691 -0.0727* -0.0273
(0.0131) (0.0536) (0.0245) (0.0112) (0.0381) (0.0157)
Observations 143 143 143 135 135 135
F-Test 1st 4.934 19.35 7.767 36.29
ln(σ returns)-0.00339** -0.0186* -0.00781** -0.00381** -0.0190** -0.00991***
(0.00143) (0.00914) (0.00319) (0.00157) (0.00726) (0.00301)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
ln(Z-score) 0.00429** 0.0238* 0.00785* 0.00434** 0.0221** 0.00887**
(0.00195) (0.0122) (0.00421) (0.00153) (0.0101) (0.00321)
Observations 135 134 134 135 134 134
F-Test 1st 6.919 18.85 9.138 37.08
Leverage -0.244** -0.982** -0.519** -0.289 -0.959** -0.647**
(0.108) (0.416) (0.223) (0.169) (0.357) (0.276)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. The first stage regressions
are the ones with ln(CDS) as risk metric in the 2SLS estimation (for other metrics the first
stage statistics could be slightly different as the number of observations could be different). Each
regression includes bank and year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without
fixed effects. IV2 refers to the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed
effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the
Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11 – Systemic risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Control Set 1
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
LRMES -0.136 -0.452 -0.189 -0.151 -0.499* -0.193
(0.147) (0.328) (0.187) (0.144) (0.263) (0.184)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
SRISK -0.320 -1.622** -0.904*** -0.350 -1.605*** -0.989**
(0.266) (0.671) (0.293) (0.281) (0.488) (0.348)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
∆ CoVaR CDS -0.000736 -0.00289 -0.00139 -0.000369 -0.000601 -0.000939
(0.00145) (0.00726) (0.00194) (0.00135) (0.00464) (0.00146)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
∆ CoVaR Equ. -0.000221 -0.00280* -0.000860 -0.000259 -0.00262* -0.00104*
(0.000248) (0.00157) (0.000551) (0.000280) (0.00136) (0.000564)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
F-Test 1st 5.394 19.20 8.184 36.56
Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. Each regression includes bank
fixed effects and year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects.
IV2 refers to the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control
Set: ln(Total Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset
ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.2 Alternative Datasets
In this section, we replicate tables 5 and 6 of the paper with alternative datasets. Firstly,
we use the Claessens and Van Horen [1] (CvH hereafter) dataset that is mainly focused on retail
banking. We restrict the dataset available online1 to the years and the host and origin countries
covered in the paper. CvH dataset stops in 2013 so our analysis is restricted to the 2005-2013
period. Then, for each entity, we recover the parent holding through manual searches on the
Internet. Finally, we only keep the parent holdings corresponding to the 15 G-SIBs covered in
the paper. The CvH dataset is much more restricted than ours since it is mainly concentrated
in retail banking. Over the period, we observe 50 openings.
We also use the dataset of the paper before the manual treatment of all observations. In this
manual treatment, we corrected for the limitations of our sources and we excluded some activities
(for instance real estate activities). In this robustness test, we only apply two treatments: first,
we delete all affiliates located in U.K. overseas territories or in Gibraltar and then we adjust the
openings at the dates that correspond to the merge between two different sources in 2011. We
also observe unusual entries in 2014 in Orbis, probably due to changes from the data provider.
Only for these two years (2011 and 2014) we use the openings recorded in the treated datasets.
1https://www.dnb.nl/en/onderzoek-2/databases/bank.jsp
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Table 12 – Individual risk metrics – CvH Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Controls
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
First Stage 146.7381** -0.0004** 178.8492*** -.0007**
(60.5311) (0.0002) (63.2478) (0.0004)
ln(CDS) -0.0358* -0.406** -0.504** -0.0464** -0.387*** -0.424**
(0.0187) (0.178) (0.223) (0.0177) (0.143) (0.212)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.964 0.876 0.823 0.972 0.895 0.877
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
LLP -0.130 -1.500** -2.246** -0.211 -1.493** -2.525**
(0.0935) (0.693) (0.962) (0.147) (0.576) (1.144)
Observations 142 142 142 134 134 134
R-squared 0.288 -0.640 -1.928 0.479 -0.297 -2.052
F-Test 1st 8.517 4.809 11.14 3.827
ln(σ returns) -0.0132 -0.272** -0.353* -0.0231* -0.257** -0.197
(0.0167) (0.126) (0.190) (0.0124) (0.101) (0.120)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.891 0.696 0.553 0.906 0.735 0.812
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
ln(Z-score) 0.0161 0.338** 0.244 0.0326* 0.283** 0.172
(0.0188) (0.163) (0.194) (0.0162) (0.117) (0.119)
Observations 134 133 133 134 133 133
R-squared 0.838 0.512 0.674 0.883 0.693 0.825
F-Test 1st 5.522 4.815 7.793 3.951
Leverage -0.0334 -13.51** -28.32** -0.894 -12.40** -11.01*
(1.030) (6.173) (13.95) (0.994) (4.973) (6.419)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.564 -0.014 -1.986 0.623 0.157 0.262
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first stage regressions are the ones with ln(CDS) as
risk metric in the 2SLS estimation (for other metrics the first stage statistics could be slightly
different as the number of observations could be different). Each regression includes bank and
year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to
the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total
Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p
<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13 – Systemic risk metrics – CvH Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Control Set 1
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
LRMES -0.786 -6.686* -12.93* -0.900 -7.371** -8.177
(0.668) (3.772) (6.801) (0.583) (3.055) (5.473)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.625 0.270 -0.876 0.664 0.236 0.123
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
SRISK 0.284 -23.73** -31.72** -0.879 -22.06** -16.66*
(1.725) (10.80) (14.57) (0.992) (8.739) (9.263)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.644 -0.448 -1.295 0.702 -0.176 0.215
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
∆ CoVaR CDS -0.00806 -0.0618 0.143 -0.0114 -0.0127 0.0483
(0.0131) (0.0587) (0.121) (0.0106) (0.0440) (0.0787)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.688 0.646 0.361 0.747 0.747 0.693
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
∆ CoVaR Equ. -0.00401 -0.0342** -0.0288 -0.00461* -0.0326** -0.0176
(0.00242) (0.0155) (0.0202) (0.00249) (0.0130) (0.0125)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.853 0.669 0.728 0.857 0.689 0.821
F-Test 1st 5.877 5.632 7.996 3.954
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank fixed effects and year fixed
effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to the instrument
generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income
Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 14 – Individual risk metrics – Extended Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Controls
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
First Stage 28.4202*** 1.6641*** 31.5984*** 1.7255***
(10.3122) (0.2632) (10.3859) (0.2368)
ln(CDS) -0.000547 -0.0115** -0.00103 -0.000574 -0.0142** -0.00160
(0.000816) (0.00542) (0.00119) (0.000934) (0.00569) (0.00148)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.963 0.919 0.963 0.971 0.901 0.970
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
LLP -0.00893** -0.0245** -0.0101** -0.00827** -0.0347*** -0.0116***
(0.00399) (0.0109) (0.00386) (0.00299) (0.0123) (0.00346)
Observations 142 142 142 134 134 134
R-squared 0.326 0.186 0.325 0.495 0.124 0.489
F-Test 1st 6.303 43.04 8.751 55.05
ln(σ returns) -0.00149** -0.00819** -0.00186*** -0.00177*** -0.00979*** -0.00239***
(0.000530) (0.00339) (0.000700) (0.000340) (0.00350) (0.000727)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.895 0.818 0.894 0.910 0.796 0.909
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
ln(Z-score) 0.00189*** 0.0106** 0.00210*** 0.00165*** 0.0114*** 0.00210***
(0.000599) (0.00423) (0.000781) (0.000405) (0.00431) (0.000730)
Observations 134 133 133 134 133 133
R-squared 0.844 0.706 0.844 0.885 0.721 0.885
F-Test 1st 7.440 41.77 9.419 54.44
Leverage -0.0723 -0.442** -0.0866 -0.0944 -0.495*** -0.135*
(0.0597) (0.193) (0.0603) (0.0648) (0.180) (0.0752)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.574 0.319 0.574 0.638 0.317 0.635
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first stage regressions are the ones with ln(CDS) as
risk metric in the 2SLS estimation (for other metrics the first stage statistics could be slightly
different as the number of observations could be different). Each regression includes bank and
year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to
the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total
Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p
<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15 – Systemic risk metrics – Extended Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Control Set 1
OLS IV1 IV2 OLS IV1 IV2
LRMES -0.0180 -0.192 -0.0180 -0.0293 -0.256** -0.0202
(0.0312) (0.127) (0.0218) (0.0316) (0.127) (0.0211)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.620 0.440 0.620 0.661 0.364 0.660
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
SRISK -0.0976 -0.721** -0.159 -0.106 -0.830*** -0.194
(0.0923) (0.306) (0.109) (0.0887) (0.287) (0.121)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.654 0.223 0.650 0.713 0.133 0.704
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
∆ CoVaR CDS -0.000648 -0.00115 -0.000941*** -0.000498 -0.000257 -0.000890***
(0.000437) (0.00179) (0.000328) (0.000411) (0.00176) (0.000326)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.690 0.688 0.689 0.747 0.747 0.746
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
∆ CoVaR Equ.-0.000172*** -0.00125** -0.000252*** -0.000175*** -0.00135*** -0.000296**
(4.96e-05) (0.000526) (8.59e-05) (5.42e-05) (0.000500) (0.000113)
Observations 144 144 144 135 135 135
R-squared 0.853 0.717 0.853 0.856 0.688 0.855
F-Test 1st 6.998 40.59 9.162 53.95
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank fixed effects and year fixed
effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to the instrument
generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income
Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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B.3 Alternative independent variable
One may argue that within a bank k expanding in a foreign country j at date t, the intensive
margin of expansion (the number of openings) may be observed with some error. There could
be many reasons for which we record more entries than what actually happened. We tried to
manually treat this problem by systematically dropping duplicate observations. However some
very small entities could be still recorded.
Here, to control for this possibility we use an alternative independent variable. Instead of
counting the number of openings, we count the number of countries in which a G-SIB entered
a given year. By doing this we eliminate the intensive margin of openings in a country. With j
being a host country:
Openingskt =
∑
j
1Openingjkt
For this exercise, we use two instrumental variables. First, we use our preferred instrument
that is IV2 in the main text (in column 3 and 6 of baseline tables). We also consider an
instrumental variable constructed in the same way as the independent variable. We consider that
there is at least one foreign opening in a country as long as the number of predicted openings in
country j is larger than 0.8. We refer to this instrument as IV2Dummy.
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Table 16 – Individual risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Controls
OLS IV2 IV2Dummy OLS IV1 IV2Dummy
First Stage 0.4385*** 0.7752*** 0.4487*** 0.7780***
(0.0910) (0.1466) (0.0885) (0.1450)
ln(CDS) -0.0156** -0.0390*** -0.0426** -0.0177** -0.0563*** -0.0652***
(0.00687) (0.0131) (0.0193) (0.00691) (0.0156) (0.0220)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.965 0.961 0.960 0.972 0.963 0.958
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
LLP -0.0429 -0.0641 -0.0720 -0.0420 -0.105** -0.112**
(0.0477) (0.0457) (0.0620) (0.0371) (0.0434) (0.0548)
Observations 143 143 143 135 135 135
R-squared 0.295 0.291 0.287 0.472 0.437 0.428
F-Test 1st 22.33 18.05 24.87 15.81
ln(σ returns) -0.0105 -0.0285** -0.0329** -0.0134** -0.0382*** -0.0461***
(0.00602) (0.0113) (0.0157) (0.00543) (0.0113) (0.0166)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.894 0.885 0.880 0.909 0.891 0.878
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
ln(Z-score) 0.0137 0.0294** 0.0385* 0.0146** 0.0344*** 0.0396**
(0.00851) (0.0126) (0.0200) (0.00681) (0.0108) (0.0174)
Observations 135 134 134 135 134 134
R-squared 0.842 0.835 0.824 0.885 0.874 0.868
F-Test 1st 21.46 16.81 25.78 15.88
Leverage -0.914** -1.898*** -2.613*** -1.243*** -2.492*** -3.261***
(0.335) (0.586) (0.894) (0.411) (0.685) (0.898)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.589 0.559 0.499 0.672 0.620 0.536
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first stage regressions are the ones with ln(CDS) as
risk metric in the 2SLS estimation (for other metrics the first stage statistics could be slightly
different as the number of observations could be different). Each regression includes bank and
year fixed effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to
the instrument generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total
Assets), Income Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p
<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17 – Systemic risk metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Control Set 1
OLS IV2 IV2Dummy OLS IV2 IV2Dummy
LRMES -0.478 -0.690* -1.151** -0.551 -0.744* -1.502***
(0.417) (0.359) (0.488) (0.405) (0.376) (0.480)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.625 0.621 0.581 0.667 0.664 0.583
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
SRISK -0.974 -3.306*** -4.661*** -1.256* -3.812*** -5.052***
(0.703) (0.902) (1.334) (0.656) (1.062) (1.270)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.661 0.561 0.410 0.729 0.609 0.464
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
∆ CoVaR CDS 0.000537 -0.00508 0.000934 0.00222 -0.00362 0.00771
(0.00606) (0.00556) (0.00743) (0.00573) (0.00545) (0.00783)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.686 0.682 0.686 0.746 0.741 0.741
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
∆ CoVaR Equ. -0.00136 -0.00314*** -0.00536** -0.00158 -0.00402*** -0.00644***
(0.000924) (0.00120) (0.00215) (0.00103) (0.00142) (0.00236)
Observations 145 145 145 136 136 136
R-squared 0.854 0.848 0.823 0.859 0.847 0.811
F-Test 1st 23.22 17.16 25.72 16.48
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes bank fixed effects and year fixed
effects. IV1 refers to the instrument generated without fixed effects. IV2 refers to the instrument
generated with bank and host-country-time fixed effects. Control Set: ln(Total Assets), Income
Diversity, Asset Diversity, Tier1 ratio and the Deposit-to-asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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